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Policy commitment and credibility are important for inducing agents to make
costly, irreversible investments. Policy uncertainty can delay investment and reduce
the response to policy change. I provide theoretical and novel quantitative evidence
for these effects by focusing on trade policy, a ubiquitous but often overlooked source
of uncertainty, when a firm’s cost of export market entry is sunk. While an explicit
purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) is to secure long term market access, little theoretical and empirical work
analyzes the value of these agreements for reducing uncertainty to prospective ex-
porters.
Within a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms, I show that trade policy un-
certainty will delay the entry of exporters into new markets and make them less
responsive to applied tariff reductions. Policy instruments that reduce or eliminate
uncertainty such as PTAs or binding trade policy commitments at the WTO can
increase entry even when applied protection is unchanged. I test the predictions for
WTO commitments by a developed country, Australia, and the value of securing
preferences through a PTA for a developing country, Portugal circa 1986.
I test the model using a disaggregated and detailed dataset of product level
Australian imports in 2004 and 2006. I use the variation in tariffs and binding com-
mitments across countries, products and time, to construct model-consistent measures
of uncertainty. The estimates indicate that lower WTO commitments increase entry.
Reducing trade policy uncertainty is at least as effective quantitatively as unilat-
eral applied tariff reductions for Australia. These results illuminate and quantify an
important new channel for trade creation in the world trade system.
I use Portugal’s accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986 to test
whether securing pre-existing preferences reduced trade policy uncertainty for firms.
I use a firm-level dataset of Portugeuse exporters to show that net entry into EC
was higher than what could have been achieved if the EC had simply lowered tariffs
without admitting Portugal to the EC. Structural estimates from the model suggest
that EC accession reduced the probabality of preference reversals to higher tariffs by
up to 24 percent.
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Introduction
Policy commitment and credibility are extremely important for inducing eco-
nomic agents to make investments, particularly when they entail large irreversible
costs. Trade policy is one area where commitment and credibility are potentially
very important. The need for predictability is a founding principle of the World
Trade Organization1. Business and policy makers often cite predictable and secure
policy regimes as benefits of joining preferential trade agreements.2 Despite this, a
substantial portion of global trade occurs under trade policy regimes that are not
secure. For example, there was widespread fear of protectionism following the global
financial crisis of 2008.3 Yet most theoretical and empirical trade research focuses on
trade policy in static, deterministic frameworks. I show theoretically and empirically
that when trade policy is uncertain, conducting analysis under de facto certainty
can be misleading and overlooks a quantitatively important channel of gains from
multilateral policy commitments.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor of the
WTO, was formed in 1948 to prevent a repeat of the 1930s trade wars by secur-
ing multilateral commitments to eschew protectionism. It’s founding charter states,
“binding against increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall in principle
be recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the substantial reduction of high
duties or the elimination of tariff preferences.”4 But the principle that constraints
1Under the principle “Predictability: through binding and transparency” the WTO ex-
plains that “Sometimes, promising not to raise a trade barrier can be as important as low-
ering one, because the promise gives businesses a clearer view of their future opportunities”
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact2 e.htm (accessed October 27, 2010)
2Australian telecommunications provider Telstra contends that trade agreements “lock in exist-
ing levels of domestic liberalisation, preventing parties from introducing more restrictive measures
in the future. This increases certainty and reduces foreign investment risk,”Telstra Corporation,
Submission 31 to the Productivity Commission on Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, March
16, 2010, p.1
3To counter this perception the G-20 summit communique pledged “We will not repeat the
historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras.” http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-
aims/summit-communique/ (accessed November 9, 2010).
4Emphasis added. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related
Documents, Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, April 1948, p. 31
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on future policy could be as valuable as applied tariff concessions has never been
widely accepted or quantified; the trade off continues to be a source of controversy in
multilateral negotiations (Evenett, 2007).
Even though the potential for large scale “trade wars” currently seems remote,
trade policy uncertainty is pervasive in the world trade system . For example, many
countries enacted discriminatory and protectionist measures in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis. Global Trade Alert has since identified nearly 700 measures that have
harmed foreign commercial interests (Evenett, 2010). I discuss these and other sources
of uncertainty in section 2. My primary focus is on the tariff, one of several forms
of applied protection that fall under the WTO rule-based system. WTO members
make enforceable commitments not to raise applied tariffs above maximum binding
constraints.5 These “bindings” are presently well above applied tariffs in some coun-
tries leaving wide scope for protectionism. Over 30 percent of the tariff lines of WTO
members could be increased unilaterally without providing compensation to affected
trade partners (Bchir et al., 2005). Australia, for example, could raise tariffs from
an average of 3.8 to 11 percent; Indonesia from 6.7 to 35.6 percent, and; the aver-
age developing country from 8 to 28 percent (Messerlin, 2008). In short, the worst
case scenario if governments were to backslide into protectionism, yet not violate any
WTO rules is large. A goal of my research is to understand how these constraints
affect uncertainty and to quantify their value.
0.1 Trade Policy Uncertainty in the World Trade System
There are good reasons to be concerned about trade policy uncertainty, and
yet, there has been very little research on its sources and impacts. This may partly
be due to the fact that trade policy is perceived not to be very volatile; after all,
5A country that violated its bindings would have to provide compensation to affected trade
partners or face WTO sanctioned retaliatory tariffs.
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statutory tariff rates are legislated at most on a yearly basis. However, applied trade
policy can be more volatile than what is suggested by statutory tariff rates, since
tariffs are by no means the only type of protection. Limão and Tovar (2009) employ
the estimates in Kee et al. (2009) and note that the trade restrictiveness index for
the typical country in the world is equivalent to a uniform tariff of 14% , but jumps
to 27% when non-tariff barriers are included. Several of these NTBs are not strictly
(if at all) regulated by the WTO and even the ones that are can be used by countries,
sometimes on a temporary basis and for specific goods. But even temporary measures
can remain in place for months or years.6
The ability to use unregulated policy instruments can interact with macroeco-
nomic or political shocks to generate considerable uncertainty. For example, there
was widespread fear that the recent economic downturn would result in a substantial
increase in protectionism. This included the possibility of anti-dumping measures; in-
creases in developing country tariffs from their applied level to the maximum allowed
under international agreements; and the use of government procurement measures
such as the “buy-American” provision attached to the US stimulus bill. Even though
the worst fears of a trade war were not realized, the real possibility of such an outcome
created uncertainty. Our model illustrates how these fears can affect investment and
exporting decisions.
Turning to more permanent sources of trade policy uncertainty a number of
examples stand out: first, concerns with product quality and safety raise the possibil-
ity that certain products may be completely banned from a market, e.g. genetically
modified foods in the EU; second, the US threat of import duties to counter Chi-
nese currency “manipulation”; third, the possibility of using “environmental” duties
6For example, in June 2001 the US started an investigation that eventually led to the steel
safeguards of about 30% in March 2002. These duties remained in place for almost 20 months
and were only removed after a negative ruling from the WTO. Foreign exporters of steel were not
compensated for this loss. More generally, Grinols and Perrelli (2006) report that the typical U.S.
dispute under the WTO lasts about 18 months with a large standard deviation of about 10 months.
Another example of NTBs include anti-dumping duties, which can be punitive.
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at the border to offset differences in carbon emissions in production. Even if these
policies are a remote possibility, the fact that they would be significant and possibly
permanent, if they materialize, can have important impacts on current investment
and export decisions. It is conceivable that these effects could be larger than those
of temporary exchange rate movements that may be hedged against.
One measure of governments’ concern with this source of policy uncertainty are
their attempts to negotiate trade agreements. One of the central reasons for the for-
mation of the GATT was the desire to avoid the disastrous tariff wars in the 1930’s,
which shut down many markets to exporters. Reductions in applied tariffs after 1945
were small, but Irwin (1994) suggests the credibility of the GATT regime may have
played a role in the trade and economic growth of post-war western Europe. To this
day the GATT’s successor, the WTO, lists as one of its functions and principles:
“Predictability through bindings and transparency [to] promote investment and al-
low(s) consumers to fully enjoy the benefits of competition.”7 These channels will be
central in the model below.
However, multilateral agreements are themselves uncertain in terms of timing,
negotiation outcomes and implementation. Successive rounds of trade negotiations
have repeatedly failed and later been resurrected. For example, an aborted attempt
was made to start the Uruguay Round in 1982 and negotiations only restarted in 1986.
After the UR, attempts to start a new round failed at Seattle in 1999. Moreover, each
successive round has taken longer to complete than the previous—the UR took over
7 years to complete, twice as long as expected, and the Doha Round was launched
in 2001 and it is still unresolved over nine years later. Even when an agreement is
successfully concluded the implementation takes some time, disputes arise and not
all policies are covered.
Moreover, multilateral agreements do not regulate all types of trade policy. This
7Accessed April 28 2010 at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact2 e.htm>
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can generate uncertainty in periods of crisis, as discussed above, but also in quieter
times. To see why, note that two firms exporting a similar product to the same market
may face very different policy barriers. While the tariffs that countries negotiate
multilaterally must be available to all WTO members, this so called Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) tariff is in practice often the policy faced by the “least-favoured-
nation”. The reason is the myriad of preference schemes available. These include not
only the standard PTAs but also unilateral preferences that the US, EU and several
other developed countries extend to developing nations, e.g. through the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP). These preferences generate uncertainty for the “least-
favoured-nations,” whose firms don’t know if they will face more competition from
firms that receive preferences, and also are less certain of any future multilateral tariff
reductions8.
Unilateral preference schemes, such as GSP, are also extremely uncertain for
the recipients themselves. These preferences are often conditional not only on trade
but also non-trade-related criteria that can and have triggered non-renewal for specific
countries.Because these preferences are frequently altered or withdrawn on a country-
specific basis, they create additional uncertainty for the intended recipients. The
resulting instability is an oft-cited reason these programs may have been ineffective
(Panagariya, 2006).9 This is one reason why recipients of such unilateral preferences
try to negotiate more permanent arrangements, even if that requires them to open
up their markets. For example, Peru and Colombia received unilateral preferences
along with other Andean countries through the ATPA, and then sought FTAs with
8Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) find that preferences provided by the US and
EU respectively caused them to maintain relatively higher multilateral tariffs against the rest of the
world in the UR.
9For example, the United States has allowed its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program
to expire 7 times for periods lasting 2-14 months between 1993-2008 (Jones, 2008). China was subject
to annual and contentious votes on renewal of it’s most favored nation (MFN) status in the U.S.
Congress until joining the WTO in 2002. Bolivia was ejected from the Andean Trade Preferences
and Drug Eradication Act in 2008 for a lack of cooperation in drug interdiction efforts.
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the US to secure permanent preferential access.10 A USITC report describes the issue
as follows:
”The probable future effects of ATPA are likely to be minimal, as
investor uncertainty over ATPA renewal and concerns about the impact
of recently negotiated U.S. bilateral FTAs with Colombia and Peru have
dampened regional interest in investment to produce ATPA-eligible ex-
ports, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador. (p. ix)” (USITC, 2008)
As just noted, preferences tend to be more secure when they are part of a formal
and reciprocal preferential trade agreement (PTAs). There are currently hundreds
of such arrangements, reflecting both trade and non-trade motives (Limão, 2007).
Potential trade benefits include not only guaranteeing access to specific markets to
secure pre-existing unilateral preferences (as described for US-Colombia, and as I will
argue for Portugal’s EC accession) but also insuring (i) against some forms of protec-
tion in that country (e.g. U.S. PTA partners were exempt from the steel safeguards)
or (ii) against a trade war breaking out in the rest of the world (Perroni and Whalley,
1994). But even the best laid plans to move forward on regional and bilateral ar-
rangements are fraught with uncertainty. Plans for an FTA of the Americas began in
the 1990s and have been abandoned. The US signed FTAs with Korea and Colombia
that still await ratification years after the main negotiations ended. Similar issues
have affected accessions to the European Market: the United Kingdom was initially
vetoed for membership in the 1960s, but later joined the club in 1972; Turkey has
been in negotiations for over 20 years; and Portugal’s road to full membership was
also long and fraught with uncertainty, as I now describe.
10Singapore, Chile and Thailand were motivated for similar reasons to do the same with Australia
(Pomfret et. al, 2010).
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0.2 Literature Review
To examine the impact of policy uncertainty I focus on a dynamic model of firm
investment and entry. If entry costs are sunk and partially irreversible, a prospective
firm must consider the time path of other variables that affect profitability. Dixit
(1989) shows that uncertainty about future prices creates an option value of waiting,
so firms will delay investments in entry or exit until they receive more information. In
this setting, entry and exit depend on the variance of shocks, their persistence and the
size of sunk costs. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) extend these theoretical insights in a
model with uncertainty about exchange rate processes and homogenous firms. They
show there is a possibility for “beachhead effects”: after a firm receives a positive
shock and pays the sunk cost of entry into exporting it will not immediately reverse
its investment even if the initial shock is reversed. Thus even temporary shocks can
have lasting effects.
There is considerable evidence that firms are heterogenous, a fact that is impor-
tant in the context of international trade. Starting with Bernard and Jensen (1995)
an extensive literature has developed, which documents the fact that exporters tend
to be larger and more efficient than non-exporters.11 Moreover, there is evidence
of self-selection into exporting: i.e. that the larger, more productive firms are the
ones that can overcome fixed costs and export. A large number of recent models
incorporate firm heterogeneity and show it has important theoretical and empirical
implications for trade (cf. Melitz, 2003, and Bernard et al. 2003). Especially impor-
tant from my perspective is the fact that in this type of model the extensive margin
may dominate the response of trade flows to reductions in trade barriers (as argued
by Chaney, 2008) and that the failure to control for firm heterogeneity in gravity
models results in an upward bias to aggregate estimates of trade frictions (Helpman
11We can also verify this directly in our data for Portugal in the period we are interested: in 1987
the median number of employees for all exporting firms (with at least one employee) was 28, which
is 7 times larger than the median number for all private non-agricultural firms in the economy.
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et al., 2008). Therefore I will focus on a dynamic model of entry into exports where
firms have heterogenous productivity.
The evidence of sunk costs in export-market entry (cf. Roberts and Tybout,
1997) has lead some to consider alternative sources of uncertainty that can gener-
ate hysteresis and real option problems in trade models. These sources of uncertainty
include exchange rate, demand, productivity, and our focus, policy uncertainty. How-
ever, most theoretical and nearly all empirical analysis of uncertainty remains confined
to the impact of exchange rate volatility, about which evidence remains mixed.12 Das
et al. (2007) find that sunk costs are quantitatively important in explaining export
participation of marginal firms in Colombia and use a structural model to show that
subsidies to sunk costs could raise entry substantially. They find limited evidence that
exchange rate volatility affects entry and exit. More broadly, studies of the impact of
exchange rate volatility on aggregate trade flows find that the effect is negative but
“fairly small and is by no means robust” (IMF, 2004, p.6).13
Policy uncertainty in general has received only limited attention in the liter-
ature. The difficulty is that most policy variations are not readily modeled by a
standard stochastic process, in part because major regime changes may be large but
low frequency “rare events.”14 Even if feared reversals to disastrous trade protection
or threatened trade wars never materialize, the small possibility of these worst case
scenario outcomes can have measurable economic effects, as Barro (2006) has recently
shown for asset markets. Most work in this area is theoretical. Rodrik (1991), for
12Campa (2004) finds evidence of sunk costs of entry for Spanish firms but smaller than anticipated
effects of exchange rate volatility. Baldwin (1988) uses aggregate data and finds that large exchange
rate shocks in the 1980s may have led to “beachhead effects”. But given the aggregate nature of the
data he is unable to rule out alternative explanations for the findings.
13Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2009) incorporate evolving productivity uncertainty into a heteroge-
neous firms model to show that sunk costs can generate a large number of small persistent exporters,
which is consistent with having an option value of waiting to exit. Arkolakis (2009) explains this
same pattern by assuming increasing fixed costs of market penetration to reach consumers in a model
without an option value of waiting to enter.
14This leads Hassett and Metcalf (1999) to model the application and removal of an investment
tax credit as a Poisson jump process. They find such a model is more consistent with observed firm
behavior when output prices are already subject to uncertainty.
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example, develops a model of capital investment when firms believe an investment
tax credit reform may be reversed in the future. If the probability of a policy reversal
is high, a reform to promote investment may produce exactly the opposite outcome.15
A small body of work has has considered the impact of trade policy uncertainty
on entry, exit and trade. Irwin (1994) analyzes the impact the GATT for western
Europe in the decade following World War II. He concludes that tariff reductions
under the GATT were limited, but the commitment to lock-in existing tariffs under
a credible international agreement may have played an important role in post-war
economic recovery and trade growth. Evenett et al. (2004) use the differences between
preferential tariffs and MFN tariffs in the period before and after WTO accession to
test the importance of tariff security. Results for Bulgaria and Ecuador are mixed.
Francois and Martin (2004) demonstrate that tariff volatility can have negative welfare
implications. They provide simulation evidence that by truncating the distriubution
of tariffs, WTO bindings on agricultural products within the OECD could reduce the
tariff volatility. An older body of literature examines optimal trade policy under risk
aversion. For example, Anderson and Young (1982) show that import quota ceilings
can reduce uncertainty about domestic and foreign demand conditions.
More broadly, this research is related to the ongoing empirical debate regarding
the value of multilateral and bilateral agreements. Rose (2004), for example, questions
whether there are any tangible benefits to WTO membership. Subramanian and
Mattoo (2008) contend that there is little need to conclude a multilateral round of
new commitments because the proliferation of PTAs has locked in low applied tariff
rates. But the aggregate evidence on trade growth following PTAs is also mixed.
Some studies have found PTAs increase trade by nearly 100% or more over the long
run (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Magee 2003). In other cases, trade growth is small
15Johnson et al. (1997) show that reform credibility is essential to inducing firms to switch to
costly but more productive technology. Empirically, Aizenman and Marion (1993) show that high
volatility of monetary and fiscal aggregates has negative effects on investment and growth in cross-
country regressions.
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or even negative. The effects vary by agreement, region and time period (Frankel,
1997; Baier, Bergstrand and Vidal, 2007). Much less is known about the mechanism
behind this growth because most empirical work does not examine the details of
PTA policy changes (Hillberry, 2009). For example, Kehoe (2005) shows how applied
general equilibrium models grossly under-predicted trade growth following NAFTA
on an ex-ante basis. Ruhl (2008) provides a related explanation to the mechanism in
this paper. If PTAs are large permanent reductions in trade frictions, then expected
profits in all future states of the world are higher. This induces entry and increases
trade flows on average.
Other explanations for large increases in trade following PTAs include competi-
tive reallocation and productivity enhancing investment following trade liberalization
(Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Chaney, 2005; Trefler, 2004) and vertical specializa-
tion where goods cross multiple borders in stages of production (Yi, 2003; Hummels,
Ishii and Yi, 2001). Both channels leave room for trade policy uncertainty to play
a complementary role. Reallocation from entry, exit and investment and the choice
to vertically fragment production are firm decisions made under uncertainty about
trade policy. Reductions in uncertainty over the joint distribution of tariffs across
multiple borders could amplify the effects of reallocation or vertical specialization on
trade flows.
Recent research has examined the effects of time-varying aggregate uncertainty
on firm investment. Bloom et al. (2007) examine investment at a panel of UK firms.
They measure aggregate uncertainty using the volatility of the stock market. Bloom
(2007) discusses the effect of uncertainty on R&D spending. A central finding of this
research is that uncertainty diminishes planned investment in two ways. The first is a
“delay effect” whereby firms put off investments in response to increasing uncertainty.
The second is a “cautionary effect” that leads firms to reduce the responsiveness of
planned investment to positive demand shocks under uncertainty. These measures
10
and concepts of uncertainty differ from trade policy uncertainty in important ways.
Policy processes are distinct from the standard stochastic processes often posited for
other macroeconomic variables. The actual degree of aggregate uncertainty is not
observed. This requires proxy measures of uncertainty such as stock market volatility
and firm growth rate dispersion. Unlike trade policy uncertainty, there is also little
to no measurable variation in aggregate uncertainty across firms or products to study
and exploit empirically. Nevertheless, I do adopt the same “caution” and “delay”
terminology since the underlying mechanism driving these effects is related.
0.3 Outline of Thesis
0.3.1 Theory
I consider how changes in trade policy regimes such as preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) and multilateral commitments could reduce trade policy uncertainty.
When the costs of market entry are sunk, uncertainty over future conditions can gen-
erate an option value of waiting until uncertainty is resolved or conditions improve
(Dixit, 1989). There is strong empirical evidence of sunk costs to export market entry,
but most previous research has focused on the impact of exchange rate uncertainty
with mixed findings (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007; Alessandria and
Choi, 2007; Campa, 2004). Of the many sources of uncertainty faced by a prospective
exporter (e.g. exchange rate or demand shocks), the trade policy toward the firm’s
goods poses a country and product specific risk that is difficult if not impossible to
diversify.
I use a dynamic, heterogeneous firms trade model similar to Chaney (2008) in
which firm productivities are known ex-ante. Firms must decide whether and when
to begin exporting when foreign market entry costs are sunk and there is uncertainty
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over trade policy.16 I use a stochastic process which incorporates uncertainty over the
timing of trade policy changes and the magnitude of those changes when they arrive.
Prospective entrants compare the value of beginning to export today versus waiting.
On the margin, the expected value of waiting to enter until applied policy conditions
improve exactly offsets the expected upside from future reductions in protection con-
ditional on entry. The present value of the difference between exporting and waiting
reflects only the potential for “bad news” and this leads firms to delay entry. Sev-
eral roles emerge for policy constraints and stability on the extensive margin: first,
I show that bindings reduce uncertainty by censoring the range of observable tariffs
and limiting losses in the worst case scenario; second, the frequent arrival of policy
changes reduces the level of firm entry; and third, firms respond more cautiously on
the extensive margin when tariff changes are likely to be quickly reversed or when
tariffs can reach substantially higher levels in the future.
0.3.2 Product Level Evidence: Australia
Despite the dynamic nature of the model, I provide a closed form solution for
the firm entry decision as a function of applied policy and uncertainty parameters.
I derive a structural equation and measures of uncertainty from the model to test
whether binding commitments and PTAs reduce trade policy uncertainty. I formulate
this in terms of a latent variable capturing the value of entry and estimate a linear
probability model of observing trade in a disaggregated product as a proxy for firm
entry. The method is novel for two reasons: first, I am able to use the observable levels
of tariff bindings to test for the impact of uncertainty with the standard deterministic
model nested as a null hypothesis; second, the uncertainty measures can be directly
controlled by policy so I can use the estimated model to quantify the relative impact
16In contrast, a firm in the standard Melitz (2003) model has initial uncertainty about its produc-
tivity which is resolved ex-post after paying a sunk cost of entry. A free entry condition combined
with an unbounded mass of identical potential entrants drives the option value of waiting to zero.
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of reducing applied protection versus the impact of reducing tariff uncertainty.
The empirical method requires detailed product level trade data and correspond-
ing data on applied and bound tariffs for a single importer. I focus on Australia’s
“most favored nation” trade partners in the years 2004 and 2006. High quality and
detailed data on products and tariffs are available during this period and, more impor-
tantly, there is wide variation across products in binding commitments. As described
in Section 2.1, other aspects of Australian trade policy raise issues of uncertainty
that are hardly unique to this application. I find that lower bindings, holding applied
tariffs fixed, bring the entry decision forward and make firms more responsive to tariff
changes on the margin. My estimates indicate that cautionary effects due to uncer-
tainty make firms over 30 percent less responsive to tariff reductions in the average
Australian tariff line. The model predicts that if Australia unilaterally reduced tariffs
to free trade levels, the number of traded products would increase by 6 percent. Al-
ternatively, if Australia both reduced tariffs to zero and bound them through WTO
commitments, the combined impact of removing the motives for caution and delay
would increase the number of traded products by over 12 percent. These estimates
empirically quantify the value of binding tariff commitments for the first time.
0.3.3 Firm Level Evidence: Portugal
In Chapter 3, I study Portugal’s accession to the European Community in the
1980s using firm-level export data. The application is complementary to the findings
in Chapter 2 for several reasons. First, Portugal was a developing country in 1980s.
Understanding the role of uncertainty in EC accession carries lessons for other de-
veloping countries joining regional PTAs. Second, the application studies firm-level
data on exports from a single country, Portugal, to many potential destinations. This
permits direct estimation and interpretation of some structural parameters from the
model. Third, the primary risk to Portugeuse exporters at the time of accession was
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losing preferential market access to the EC rather than a reversal to binding tariff
levels.
To approach this application, I derive a structural equation for net export mar-
ket entry at the industry level to estimate whether EC accession reduced trade policy
uncertainty. The estimates imply that Portuguese firms placed a 24% probability on
the possibility of losing preferential access to the EC before accession. Entry following
accession was higher than what would have occurred if the reduction in current tariffs
had not been credible.
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Chapter 1
A Theory of Export Market Entry Under Trade Policy Uncertainty
1.1 Deterministic Model
The basic setup is similar to Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008), but
extended to a deterministic multi-period framework. The world has J exporting
countries indexed by j. Each country has Lj consumers that inelastically supply
labor to the market. I consider a single importer, but the model can be extended to
a multi-country world. Goods shipped to the importing country are subject to tariffs
which may vary by export country of origin and industry. The focus of the model
is the effect on trade and market entry patterns of different trade policy regimes. In
the following section, I extend this analysis to a stochastic tariff process and compare
the results to the deterministic outcomes in order to draw out the role of policy
uncertainty for trade.
1.1.1 Preferences
Utility in the importing country is a Cobb-Douglas function over a homoge-
neous traditional good traded on world markets at zero cost and a continuum of










where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The total set of
varieties available Ω is the union of all domestically produced varieties and those
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that are imported from abroad with an expenditure share of µ ∈ (0, 1). Utility is




p(v)q(v)dv = Y. (1.2)













In each exporting country j, some product varieties are only consumed domestically,
but a fraction are exported overseas. Varieties are differentiated by the producing
firm and country of origin. The set of foreign varieties available in the importing
country is endogenous and derived below.
1.1.2 Production and Tariff Barriers
The homogeneous good is freely traded and produced under CRS such that
one unit of the good is produced for 1/wj units of labor in country j. I take the
homogeneous good as numeraire and normalize its price to unity, p0 = 1. Labor
market clearing implies that the wage for country j is wj. The differentiated goods
are subject to trade costs. These take the form of ad-valorem tariffs that may vary
by exporter j. I let τj ≥ 1 equal one plus the ad-valorem tariff for goods shipped
from country j. Tariffs are paid at the border by consumers on the factory price.
If an exporter of variety v charges price pj(v) at home, the final consumer abroad
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pays p(v) = τjpj(v). There are no tariffs on domestic sales for firms in the importing
country (i.e. τ = 1).
A firm producing variety v in exporter j is identified by its unit labor require-
ment cj(v). The total variable costs to produce q units of a differentiated product are
wjcj(v)qj(v). Operating profits from exporting for a firm with unit labor costs cj are
πj(p) = pj(v)qj(τjpj(v))− wjcjqj(τjpj(v)) (1.5)
In this setup, the exporter takes account of the fact that import tariffs will reduce
demand and scale down revenues. Profit maximization by monopolistically compet-
itive firms yields the standard markup rule over marginal cost. The consumer price





Combining the formulas for the markup rule, consumer demand and variable costs, the











The quantity Aj summarizes exporter cost and importer demand conditions.
I index variation in aggregate productivity across exporting countries by 1/Mj. I
then assume there is a distribution of firms, G(c), which summarizes the heterogeneity
in unit costs within each country and is bounded below at cL. The lowest unit cost





1.1.3 Entry, Exit and Sunk Costs
There is a fixed cost of market entry Ke paid by a firm to begin exporting.
Entry costs cover the expenses of setting up a distribution network, on-site visits
or agency costs, marketing, tailoring products to local markets and complying with
safety regulations. There are no fixed entry or per period maintenance costs in a
firm’s domestic market. Since operating profits are always positive, albeit potentially
quite small, every firm sells in its home market. A subset of firms pay the entry cost
and begin exporting if their unit costs are below a threshold cutoff level. Following
Melitz (2003), exit is induced by an exogenous death shock δ. A firm that is hit by
the death shock exits immediately without recouping its sunk costs.
In a deterministic environment, where πj(t) = πj in the foreseeable future, the
firm will enter an export market if the net present discounted value of entry is positive.









where superscript D denotes “deterministic” tariffs. The discount factor combines
the true discount rate ρ and the death shock such that β = (1−δ)/(1+ρ). Free entry
implies that in equilibrium V D = 0 for the marginal entrant. Imposing this condition










All firms with unit costs below cDj will pay the entry cost and begin exporting.





1.2.1 A framework for trade policy uncertainty
In practice, the level of future tariffs is uncertain. Many factors can affect the
formation of trade policy over time. I take shocks to trade policy as given and do
not explicitly model their source. Tariffs are a random variable with two sources
of variation: uncertainty over the timing of policy changes, and uncertainty over
the magnitude of those changes when they arrive. Even though the outcome of
policy changes is unknown ex-ante, firms can form expectations over the likely tariff
outcomes.
To model tariff uncertainty, I assume shocks to the path of tariffs arrive with
probability γ per unit of time.2 When a shock arrives, a policy maker sets a new tariff
τ ′. Firms know the value of γ and can assign probability measures to different tariff
outcomes. The space of potential tariff outcomes and their likelihood are summarized
by the distribution function H(τ ′) with support [1, τmax]. The support allows the
possibility of free trade (τ = 1) or a theoretical maximum tariff τmax. Conceptually,
letting τmax →∞ admits the possibility of total autarky.
Given τt, the arrival rate of shocks and the policy distribution, the conditional
1This is higher than the usual elasticity of unity because tariffs are paid at the border, rather
than as part of the firm’s variable trade cost technology.
2In continuous time, a similar Poisson process for the arrival of tax policy changes can be found
in Rodrik (1991) and Hassett and Metcalf (1999).
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expected value and variance of the tariff next period are
Et(τt+1) = (1− γ)τt + γE(τ ′) (1.11)
Vart(τt+1) = γ(1− γ)[τt − E[τ ′]]2 + γVar[τ ′]. (1.12)
The quantity E(τ ′) is the unconditional expected tariff drawn from H(τ ′), given that
a policy shock occurs. The expected tariff in the next period depends only on the
level of the tariff today and the stochastic process for tariff changes. The long run
autocorrelation of the tariff is 1−γ. A stable trade policy regime will have a low value
of γ and as a result will display high persistence in tariffs. Even with persistence, this
structure allows for the possibility of large shocks if H(τ ′) has thick tails. In contrast,
frequent policy changes (high γ) do not necessarily generate high uncertainty if H(τ ′)
has small dispersion.
The model permits a straightforward treatment of the impact of PTAs and
bindings on the entry decision. PTA implementation affects two parameters: the
probability of the tariff change γ, and the levels of current and future tariffs τt. If
a PTA is credible, the firm’s problem approaches the deterministic cutoff and this is
modeled by letting γ → 0.
Even if the PTA does not reduce γ to zero, tariff bindings can have an effect
on entry by limiting the magnitude of a worst case scenario tariff shock. A credible
WTO binding is the maximum tariff permitted by WTO rules. The commitment to
bind tariffs is a constraint on observable tariff outcomes such that the distribution
of future tariffs, H(τ ′), is censored at the binding. By analogy to Tobit regression,
censoring captures the idea that a policy maker might want to set a tariff above
the binding but WTO legal constraints mean that only the binding tariff is actually
observed.
I let B denote the binding level of the maximum tariff. For a binding to be
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effective, it must be below the maximum of the unbound tariff distribution such that
B < τmax. Binding commitments induce a mixed discrete and continuous distribu-
tion over tariffs. A formal statement of the bound tariff distribution appears in the
appendix. When a policy shock arrives, the new tariff is a random draw from H(τ ′).
There is a discrete probability H(B) that the tariff draw is below the binding. But
with probability 1−H(B), the tariff draw is above the binding and only the bound
tariff rate is observed. The probabilities of extreme draws in the unbound distribution
of τ are placed at the binding, thus reducing the mean and variance of tariffs.
1.2.2 Entry and Exit under Uncertainty
Under a stochastic tariff process, there is an option value of waiting with a
structure similar to Baldwin and Krugman (1989). While the current tariff is known,
future profit flows are subject to the stochastic process for tariffs. The firm’s decision
to enter an export market is an optimal stopping problem. Firms can be divided
into exporters, state 1, and non-exporters, state 0. The value of being an exporter
in the current period is V 1. A firm that is in state 1 exits only when hit by the
death shock. Non-exporters hold an option value of waiting to enter in the future V 0.
Non-exporters will enter a foreign market only when the value of exporting less sunk
entry costs exceeds the value of waiting such that V 1 −Ke ≥ V 0.
The decision rule for each firm is defined by the trigger tariff τ1 that makes the
firm just indifferent between entry and waiting. For each firm, identified by its unit
labor requirement c, the entry trigger τ1 implicitly solves the indifference condition
V 1(τ1)−Ke = V 0(τ1) (1.13)
A firm will enter the export market if τt ≤ τ1.
Four equations define the initial problem at time t of a firm with unit labor
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requirement c. For clarity of exposition, I drop the country of origin subscripts. The
value of exporting is
V 1(τt) = π(τt) + β[(1− γ)V 1(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γEV 1(τ ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock Arrives
]. (1.14)
The quantity V 1(τt) is the expected present discounted value of operating profits
conditional on the current tariff τt. With probability 1− γ, the firm continues to the
next period with the same value V (τt). With probability γ, a policy shock arrives
and the tariff changes. The ex-ante expected value of exporting following a policy
change to a new tariff τ ′ is
EV 1(τ ′) = Eπ(τ ′) + β[(1− γ)EV 1(τ ′) + γEV 1(τ ′)] (1.15)
In time period t, the unconditional expected value of being an exporter next period
given that a policy shock arrives is EV 1(τ ′) in (1.15). This expectation is time invari-
ant because I assume that the distribution of future tariffs H(τ ′) is time invariant.
If a policy shock arrives in the next period or ten periods from now, the ex-ante
expected value of the tariff draw and profits remain the same. Equation (1.15) can
be solved explicitly for EV 1(τ ′) to obtain




The resulting time invariance of EV 1(τ ′) does not mean that the value of exporting
is time invariant. V 1(τt) is a function of the current tariff and firms can re-compute
it on an ex-post basis following every tariff policy change.
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The second part of the firm’s problem is the value of waiting
V 0(τt) = 0 + β[(1− γ)V 0(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γ(1−H(τ1))V 0(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock Above Trigger
+ γH(τ1)(EV




A firm that waits receives zero profits in the current period. If no policy shocks arrive
or the shock is above the entry trigger, the value of waiting remains V 0. If a policy
shock arrives next period, it will be below τ1 with probability H(τ1). If the new tariff
draw is below the entry trigger, τ ′ ≤ τ1, the firm will pay the sunk cost and transition
to exporting. Conditional on waiting until the tariff falls below the entry trigger, the
expected value of exporting is now
EV 1(τ1 | τ ≤ τ1) = Eπ(τ ′ | τ ′ < τ1 + β[(1− γ)EV 1(τ1 | τt ≤ τ1) + γEV 1(τ ′)]
(1.17)
This equation is structurally the same as (1.14), but it is evaluated ex-ante to obtain
the expected value of exporting to a firm that delays entry until a more favorable
policy shock arrives. If a firm waits to enter in the current period, it must be the case
that τt > τ1 . Expected profits at the time of entry are greater than profits today
such that π(τt) < E[π(τ
′) | τ ′ ≤ τ1]. Inevitably, a policy shock will eventually occur
and the value of exporting after an initial delay will transition to the unconditional
expected value of exporting given by (1.15).
The set of four equations (1.14),(1.15),(1.16), and (1.17) is a linear system in
the four quantities V 1(τt),EV
1(τ ′), V 0(τt), and E[V
1(τ1 | τ ≤ τ1)] and can be solved
explicitly. A full derivation appears in the appendix, but the results that follow
require expressions for only the current values of entry and waiting for the marginal
firm. The entry margin corresponds to the firm with unit labor requirement cU that
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is just indifferent to entry or waiting at time t.3 For this marginal firm, the current
tariff equals the entry trigger such that τt = τ1. The corresponding value functions
are
V 1(τ1) =
π(τ1)(1− β) + βγE[π(τ ′)]
[1− β(1− γ)](1− β)
(1.18)
V 0(τ1) = βγH(τ1)
(1− β)E[π(τ ′) | τ ′ < τ1]− βγE[π(τ ′)]− (1− β)[1− β(1− γ)]Ke
[1− β(1− γ)][1− β(1− γH(τ1))]
(1.19)
The expression in (1.13) defines a zero cutoff profit condition for the entry mar-
gin. Despite the apparent complexity of (1.18) and (1.19), a closed form expression
for the cost cutoff cU exists. I solve for the cutoff in two steps to draw out more
intuition from the model. Setting the difference between V 1 and V 0 equal to entry






βγE(π(cU , τ ′))
(1− β)[1− β(1− γ)]
+
βγH(τ1)[π(c
U , τ1)− E(π(cU , τ ′) | τ ′ < τ1)]
(1− β)[1− β(1− γ)]
]
(1.20)
The first term in brackets is the PDV of profits at the entry tariff where the discount
factor is scaled down by the probability that no policy shock arrives. If this model
were deterministic, the firm would discount by 1 − β and the next two terms would
disappear. The second term is the present value, following a shock, of profits at the
ex-ante expected tariff. The third term is a negative opportunity cost of entry. It is
the present value of the expected loss of entering today, given that a future policy
change is below the tariff entry trigger.
In the second step, I solve (1.20) directly for cU and express it in terms of an
3Superscript U denotes the “uncertain” environment in contrast the the “deterministic” environ-
ment D.
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uncertainty component Θ(τt) and the deterministic cutoff c
D:
cU = Θ(τt)× cD (1.21)
where Θ(τt) =
[
1− β + βγ∆ (τt)




As shown in the appendix, Θ(τt) ≤ 1 since ∆(τt) ≤ 1. For a given current tariff,
uncertainty over the tariff generates a lower cost cutoff than a deterministic model.
The productivity premium necessary to overcome this hurdle is the ratio of cD and
cU , or 1
Θ
.
The expression for ∆(τt) captures the random variation in the tariff conditional




t − E(τ−σ | τ ≤ τt)]
τ−σt
(1.23)
∆ (τt)− 1 = (1−H(τt))
[




I interpret ∆ (τt)− 1 as the expected proportional reduction in operating profits that
occurs following a bad shock. The leading term (1 − H(τt)) is the probability of a
shock that exceeds the current tariff for the marginal firm. The term in brackets is
the expected proportional loss in profits, starting from τt, if a bad shock arrives. The
inequality is always strict except when the current tariff is at the maximum of the
tariff distribution, in which case cD = cU .
Even though another policy shock could induce a new tariff that is higher or
lower than the current tariff, it is only the prospect of a bad shock that affects the
decision of whether to enter today. This is an example of the “bad news” principle
identified in Bernanke (1983) which holds despite the convexity of profits in tariffs.
When a firm enters, it weighs the expected PDV of profits from entering today against
the value of waiting for a better shock in the future. Because good news in the future
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is offset by the opportunity cost of entry, only bad news matters when the entry
investment is irreversible.
In terms of the stochastic process for tariffs, the model includes the deterministic
environment as a special case. When γ = 0 exactly, the option value of waiting
vanishes in equation (1.19). Both the stochastic value of entry in equation (1.18)
and the zero cutoff profit threshold collapse to their deterministic counterparts. In
effect, implementing a PTA can move firms toward the solution of the deterministic
problem.
Lastly, since the prospect of “bad news” is a key element in a firm’s entry
decision, bindings play an important role by limiting losses in tariff reversals. This
effect feeds through to a reduction in the firm’s expected proportional reduction in
profits given a reversal to higher tariffs.4
1.2.3 Implications of Uncertainty for the Entry Cutoff
Uncertainty about future trade policies delays entry at the margin relative to
the deterministic model. Reducing uncertainty will lead prospective firms to bring
entry forward even if applied tariffs remain unchanged. Uncertainty also makes firms
on the margin more cautious. For a given tariff reduction, the elasticity of the entry
cutoff to changes in tariffs is attenuated by uncertainty. These results, caution and
delay, can be derived analytically and have important implications for policy. Detailed
derivations appear in the appendix.
PROPOSITION 1 [Caution] The entry cutoff cU is less elastic with respect to










4A binding augmented version of the profit loss term ∆(τt, B) is derived in the appendix.
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PROOF:(see appendix)
The expected profit loss of a bad shock is decreasing in the current tariff τt. As the
current tariff τt increases, the expected reduction in profits given a reversal grows
smaller. Formally, I show in the appendix that the semi-elasticity of the profit loss




σ[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)]
τ−σ
≥ 0
If τt = τmax, ∆(τt) equals one, c
U = cD and the derivative goes to zero since there is
no scenario worse than the present. This implies the proportion of profits lost in a
tariff reversal, ∆(τt)− 1, is reduced.














(1− β + βγ∆)
(
[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)]
τ−σt
))]
The term in brackets, denoted by φ(τt) in the proposition, is less than or equal to
one.
In absolute magnitudes | εU(τt) |<| εD(τt) | and the responsiveness of the entry
margin is reduced under uncertainty. The two exceptions (limiting cases) are when
γ = 0 (i.e. tariffs are deterministic) or when τt is already at the maximum of the tariff
distribution. In either case, the elasticity of the cutoff under uncertainty evaluated
at the tariff maximum equals the elasticity at the deterministic cutoff.
Trade policy uncertainty also generates first order reductions in the entry mar-
gin. These are summarized in the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 2 [Delay] Higher bindings or higher arrival rates of policy shocks














(1− β(1− γ)) ((1− β (1− γ∆))
]



















This proposition isolates the effects of policy shock timing and magnitudes into two
components. First, increases in the arrival rate of policy shocks reduce entry. In the
deterministic limit ε(γ) = 0 and this delay effect vanishes. The effect is independent
of the form of the tariff distribution H(τ ′). Future tariffs could have a lower expected
value than current tariffs and some firms would still delay entry. This follows from the
option value of waiting. If a more favorable tariff regime is on the horizon, delaying
entry may be optimal. Similarly, when current tariffs are low and expected tariffs are
high, firms on the margin will wait to enter. Second, binding reductions can increase
entry, even if they do not constrain the current applied tariff, by mitigating the worst
case scenario and bringing entry forward. In an environment where policy shocks
cannot be eliminated, lower bindings can raise trade even if the binding is above the
current period applied tariff. On the extensive margin, binding reductions could be
just as effective as applied tariff reductions for increasing trade.
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1.2.4 Testable Predictions
These propositions provide theoretical grounding for the empirical application
that follows. Trade policy uncertainty reduces the number of firms exporting and
the responsiveness of the extensive margin to policy shocks. Lower binding tariff
commitments increase entry, even if the current binding is above the applied tariff.
The figurative “insurance” against backsliding through binding commitments could
be empirically relevant if prospective entrants place some probability weight on the
possibility of large scale tariff reversals. In theory, further reductions in binding
commitments through WTO negotiations would be meaningful. This is a testable
implication of the model.
The derived elasticities for tariffs and bindings can be applied to the policy
controversy over the value of non-binding, bound tariff commitments. Consider a
current tariff τ0 that is below its binding B0. Suppose the current tariff and binding
are changed by d ln τ and d lnB, respectively. The comparative static for a change in
the entry cutoff d ln cU is computed as follows
d ln cD = εU(τ0)d ln τ + ε(B0)d lnB (1.24)






(1− β + βγ∆)
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The first term is the deterministic elasticity. The second term captures relationship
between simultaneous binding and tariff changes. If the binding is unchanged, say in
a unilateral tariff reduction, then the impact on the entry cutoff is reduced. However
if both the binding and tariff change by the same amount then d lnB−d ln τ = 0 and
the second term drops out. The third term is the residual uncertainty about tariff
outcomes in the policy space between the τ0 and the binding B0. Residual uncertainty
will reduce the elasticity of the cutoff if the gap between B0 and τ0 is large and the
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probability mass in that range of the tariff distribution is high.
This comparative static result is summarized in the following corollary to propo-
sitions 1 and 2.
COROLLARY 1 [Bound tariff changes] Tariff changes accompanied by equal or
greater changes in binding commitments will generate more new entry than unbound,
unilateral tariff changes.
When tariffs are reduced unilaterally, without constraining future policy makers
through binding, the impact on the entry cutoff is mitigated. I confirm the broader




2.1 The Application to Trade Policy in Australia
I focus on Australia, a country with a confluence of high quality data and policy
variation relevant to uncertainty. In recent history, Australia maintained fairly high
applied trade barriers. Unilateral liberalization means there are now large gaps be-
tween applied protection and binding commitments. Like many developed countries,
it has recently implemented a series of PTAs. Several of the agreements were with
developing countries that already had preferential, but discretionary, market access.
These factors encompass several of the sources of trade policy uncertainty reviewed in
the introduction. Theoretically grounded empirical estimates of the role of policy un-
certainty and the interaction of various trade policy instruments for Australia should
have validity in a host of outside applications and forthcoming policy negotiations.
While Australia has low applied tariffs at present, this has not been the case his-
torically. Lloyd’s (2008) careful construction of a 100 year time series for Australian
tariffs shows that some sectors were highly protected as recently as the early 1990s.
There was a legacy of protection for non-competitive industries and political interfer-
ence in the tariff making process during the pre- and post-war period (Glezer, 1982).
Gradual and, more importantly, unilateral liberalization began in the late 1980s and
continued into the 1990s.1 Even in sectors with low applied tariffs, a prospective
exporter in the years 2002-2006 could look back little more than a decade to justify
fear of a high tariff regime.
Since higher historical tariffs were the starting point for concessions in the
1Coincidentally, journalist Paul Kelly titled his exhaustive book documenting the economic and
political upheaval of these reforms “The End of Certainty.”
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Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of multilateral negotiations (see Corden, 1996), Aus-
tralia’s binding commitments today are high and dispersed.2 Although applied tariffs
are at or near zero in many products, the maximum bound rates range from zero to
55 percent. This variation in the binding gap between applied and bound rates is
exploited empirically. Importantly, Australia removed most quotas and other quanti-
tative import restrictions in a process known as “tariffication” as part of its Uruguay
Round concessions (Snape et al. 1998). Measurement of trade barriers is now mostly
homogeneous across products.
Australia’s own Productivity Commission recently cited the prevention of “back-
sliding” on liberalization as a potential benefit of preferential trade agreements. In
their comprehensive review of Australia’s trade agreements, the Commission notes
that
. . . even where agreements do not result in a reduction in existing barriers,
they can be used to lock in current policies, restricting countries from
increasing barriers in the future (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 6.21)
As a case in point, if Australia were to revert all tariffs to their bindings this would
substantially shift the tariff profile. In 2004, only 24% of Australia’s MFN tariffs are
equal to the binding tariff commitment. The magnitude of changes in a reversal to
bindings can be large. As the histogram in Figure 1 shows, nearly 73% of MFN tariffs
could increase, some by up to 35% in the worst case scenario. Were such reversals to
occur, an exporter in the average tariff line could see his profits reduced by 19% each
year. As Figure 2 shows, the profit losses extend to nearly all product lines. A full
reversal to bindings would shift the distribution of profits down substantially relative
to the level at applied tariffs in 2004.3
2Policy makers in Australia had adopted a so-called “midway” position in multilateral nego-
tiations. Australia maintained it was neither a developing nor a fully industrialized country and
required the flexibility to impose tariffs to protect infant industries with cost disadvantages (Snape
et al. 1998).




To help understand basis for my estimation method, I provide a brief overview
of my data with additional details in section 2.3.1 and the appendix. I have annual
import data at the 10-digit level of detail for Australia from 2002-2006. There are
over 8,300 products that are potentially tradable and these are matched to country-
product specific tariff lines. These product classifications are extremely detailed. For
instance, Australian customs tracks 67 different varieties of tubes and pipes. If I break
the data down to its nuts and bolts, literally, I find there are ten different varieties of
bolts which can be fastened with two types of nuts.
These data encompass the entire population of potential importers whether a
good is traded or not. Because I know there is heterogeneity at the industry level, I
adapt the model to account for this. There are 1243 industries at the 4-digit Heading
level of the Harmonized System for product classifications. I then estimate the model
on a pooled cross-section in 2004 and 2006.
The broader empirical strategy is to use measures of uncertainty derived from
the model to test if exporters place positive weight on the probability of a reversal to
binding tariff levels. The approach exploits the cross section variation in tariffs and
bindings to model the probability that a product is traded. I use the data to address
whether uncertainty over reversals to binding tariff levels affects the long-run pattern
of entry across industries.
2.2.2 Estimation Method
I estimate the model on disaggregated product data. Trade is observed at the
product level if the unit cost of the most productive firm in country j is below the
ceding empirical section. See appendix for further details.
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cutoff for a particular variety, i.e. cLj < c
U
tjv. Data on firms from a multitude of
potential import partners are not available. A reasonable proxy for firm entry is
whether a disaggregated product is traded.4
The unit cost of the marginal firm ctjv from country j in product variety v is
not observed, but it must equal the cutoff threshold ctjv = c
U
tj. It turns out the ratio
of the cutoff for the marginal firm in product v to that of the most productive firm
in the industry cLj can be defined in terms of observables as a latent variable.
5 If the
expected PDV of entering today is greater than or equal to the fixed cost of entry, I
observe the decision of at least one firm to enter when a product is traded. I define














≡ PDV Operating Profits
Entry Cost
where the second equality follows from substitution of equations (1.21) and (1.10) for
cUtj. This quantity is the ratio of the PDV of operating profits for the most productive
firm in an industry to sunk entry costs. If Zjv ≥ 1 for at least one exporter, then
trade is observed in that product variety. Otherwise, no trade is observed.
I assume that sunk export costs are common within each industry group such
that Ke = KI . Taking logs and substituting for Θ using equation (1.22) yields
ztjv ∝ −σ ln τtjv + ln
[
1− β + βγ∆




+dtj + dtI + εtjv (2.1)
where εtjv ∼ N(0, σ2ε) is i.i.d measurement error. The exporter-year effect dtj = (1−
4The evidence of firm level entry following trade liberalizations from detailed firm studies such
as Eaton et al. (2007) is confirmed in disaggregated product level studies such as Kehoe and Ruhl
(2009) and Debaere and Mostashari (2010). Even if firm data were available, it would be difficult to
identify the set of potential exporters and estimate entry probabilities at the tariff line level for the
universe of all firms. A method for evaluation of trade policy reforms under uncertainty with more
widely available product data a contribution of this paper.
5A similar cross-country latent variable formulation is used in Helpman et al. (2008).
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σ) ln(Mj+(1−σ) lnwj encompasses unobserved heterogeneity in aggregate productiv-
ity and wages. The industry-year effect dtI = kjI +lnµI +yt+(1−σ) lnwj+(σ−1)ptI
combines unobserved heterogeneity in entry costs and demand conditions from the
price index and aggregate expenditure. Trade is observed when ztjv = ln(Ztjv) is
positive.
This specification differs from a deterministic model due to the bracketed term,
which is non-linear in the parameters of interest. In the deterministic limit where
γ = 0 the bracketed uncertainty term drops out entirely. Since I ultimately test for
presence of uncertainty, I take γ = 0 as a testable null hypothesis and linearize around







The linearized uncertainty term parsimoniously represents the two components of the
uncertainty process: the magnitude of the expected proportional loss in profits given
a policy shock arrives is captured by ∆(τtjv)−1; the arrival rate of trade policy shocks
appears linearly in γ. Estimation requires measures of the profit losses that could
occur in a reversal.
A strength of the analytical simplicity of this model and the focus on trade
policy is that measures of the expected profit loss can be constructed from tariff
data. I discretize the expected loss for a reversal to the binding tariff with probability
pB = 1−H(τtv,MFN). The discrete decomposition is
∆(τtjv)− 1 = (1−H(τtjv))








These uncertainty measure is bounded below at zero and bounded above at 1 for a re-
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versal to total autarky. For any partner and tariff line where the bound tariff is above
the applied tariff, the “binding uncertainty” measure UBtjv is positive. For example,
“Windscreens of toughened (tempered) safety glass of a kind used as components in
passenger motor vehicles” had a tariff of 5% at the MFN rate and 10% at the bound
rate in 2004. These correspond to a profit loss of 17% for binding uncertainty (UB)
when σ = 4.
Substituting the uncertainty measure into equation (2.1) yields
ztjv = −σ ln τtjv − pBγ
β
1− β
UBtjv + dtj + dtI + εtjv (2.4)
In moving from theory to data, several identifying assumption are necessary. First,
I assume a common elasticity of substitution σ across industries. Second, exporters
within an industry form the same expectations, using the same tariff distribution,
about future policies. This is necessary to identify the probability of reversals, con-
ditional on the current trade policy. The assumption is consistent with a rational
expectations environment where there are no arbitrage opportunities.
Let Ttjv be a binary indicator defined as Ttjv = 1[ztjv > 0]. I model the proba-
bility that a product is traded as p
(T=1)
tjv = Pr.(Ttjv = 1 | Xb) = F (Xb) where F (·) is
a CDF. The estimating equation using the first-order approximation is
p
(T=1)
tjv = F [bτ ln τtjv + bBU
B
tjv + dtj + dtI ]. (2.5)
Given the assumed normality of the errors, I could estimate a Probit model. However,
there are over 2000 industry-year fixed effects in the empirical application. Estimates
of these incidental parameters are potentially inconsistent, leading to bias in the
parameters of interest. I assume instead that F (·) is linear and estimate a linear
probability model (LPM) using OLS.6
6As a practical matter, I have also found that while computing marginal effects is computationally
36
A set of exporter-year fixed effects djI and industry-year effects dtI , control for
unobserved variables: differences in aggregate technology, fixed costs of entry, home
country wages, wj, terms of trade shocks, the industry price index, expenditure share
and aggregate demand. The parameters are scaled into the marginal effects on the
probability a product is traded, but they can still be interpreted in the context of the
model. The elasticity of product sales to applied tariffs is negative and estimated by
the parameter bτ = −σ up to a scale factor. The negative impact of uncertainty is
estimated up to scale by the parameter bB =
β
1−βγ · pB where the term in discount
factors is a positive constant. These coefficients are proportional to the probability
weight placed on reversals to the binding, given by γ ·pB. Negative coefficients indicate
exporters in the average tariff line place some weight on bad news when making entry
decisions.
The above first-order approximation used to compute the uncertainty terms
decouples the elasticity on applied tariffs from the uncertainty measures. In order to
measure and test the cautionary effects derived in Proposition 1 and elaborated in
the Corollary, I need to account for the fact that the uncertainty measure is function
of tariff and binding levels. The elasticity of entry to tariff and binding changes is
computed by log differentiation of the uncertainty measure. In terms of the model,
the estimated elasticity of product entry to tariff reductions, ε(τ) is the sum of the
direct effect to current profits, the first term in (2.5), and the change to future profits
feasible it is extremely memory intensive and time consuming for this model. OLS does not restrict
predicted probabilities to the range (0, 1) and raises heteroskedasticity issues. I have verified in
unreported results that signs and significance patterns are unchanged in probit fixed effect and
conditional logit specifications.
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if a reversal occurs, the second term in (2.5):


















This is simply the first order approximation to the cautionary effect derived in Propo-
sition 1. The elasticity of entry to applied tariff changes will depend on the probability
of reversals, γ · pB, and their magnitudes B−σ/τ−σ.
Proposition 2 shows that the elasticity of entry is reduced by increases in bind-
ings. I can also use the empirical model structure to obtain the elasticity of entry to














The elasticity of entry to binding changes and the cautionary effect from above are
symmetric. If bindings are reduced by the same percentage as applied tariffs, the
cautionary effect is exactly offset “as if” tariffs were deterministic. This result follows
from the Corollary to Propositions 1 and 2.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Data Implementation and Sample
A complete description of the data sources appears in the appendix. I focus
here on construction of the regression samples, tariffs and uncertainty measures.
The tariff line measure of the ad valorem applied tariff (i.e. 1+ tariff rate) is
the MFN rate offered to all WTO members. A large number of developing country
exporters are eligible for preferences under one or more programs in addition to
the MFN tariff. Utilization of these preferential tariffs is not 100% and requires
additional documentation and compliance costs (Pomfret et al., 2010). I exclude
all countries from the sample that are eligible for unilateral preferences such as the
Generalized System of Preferences even though not all tariff lines are covered under
these regimes. Since my objective is to estimate the impact of reversals to binding
tariffs for WTO members, I excluded all trade partners that have bilateral PTAs.
Evidence from Handley and Limão (2010) suggests these PTAs may offer increased
security of preferential tariffs and would contaminate my results. This restriction
excludes New Zealand in 2004 and 2006 and Thailand, Singapore and the United
States in 2006.
The uncertainty measures of the expected loss from reversals to the binding
(UB) are constructed using the theoretical structure above. Using data on MFN
applied tariffs and bindings, I construct the uncertainty measures in equation (2.3)
for parameterizations of the elasticity of substitution (σ ∈ {3, 4, 5}). I assume σ = 4
in my baseline estimates, but show these are robust to the choice of σ.7
I define an industry by the HS4 Heading of a product variety, resulting in
1243 industries. All final specifications include exporter-year and industry-year fixed
effects which control for several sources of heterogeneity in the estimating equation
7Bernard et al. (2003) estimate that σ = 3.8 using U.S. firm level trade data.
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(2.5). The critical factor to absorb in this application are the relative productivity
differences between exporters in each industry. However, because many countries
trade no products within an HS4 defined industry, they are perfectly predicted by
these fixed effects and are dropped from the regression sample.
The final samples contains 600,818 exporter-product observations for the years
2004 and 2006. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics. Within the sample, the average
applied tariffs are low at approximately 4.5 and 3.8 log percentage points in 2004 and
2006. The average potential loss is over 19% for binding uncertainty per annum.
2.3.2 Product Regressions – Baseline
The baseline linear probability estimates appear in Table 2.2. Estimated coef-
ficients from the baseline model appear in column 2. They conform precisely to the
predictions from theory. The coefficients on the applied tariff and uncertainty mea-
sures are negative and significant.8 For comparison, I run a naive model containing
only tariffs and fixed effects as regressors in column 1. Since tariffs are positively
correlated with the uncertainty measure, omitting uncertainty imparts a downward
bias to the tariff coefficient in column 1. To compare the impact of reducing bindings
versus unilaterally reducing applied tariffs, I turn to the lower panel of Table 2.2.
Caution and delay effects are large and evident after I compute the elasticities at the
mean of the uncertainty measure using expressions (2.6) and (2.7). The elasticity of
entry to tariff reductions is reduced from 28 percent to 18.5 percent, a reduction of
nearly one third due to the cautionary effect. When uncertainty is present, the re-
sponsiveness of entry to tariff reductions is substantially mitigated by caution. Delay
effects are also important. The elasticity of the probability of being traded increases
by 9 percent for every 1 percent decrease in bindings. In sum, for every 1 percentage
8Bindings are set at the 6 digit sub-heading level of the Harmonized System and do not change
through time during the sample. I have verified in unreported results that the results are robust to
clustering standard errors at the 6 digit level.
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point reduction in applied tariffs the same effect can achieved by a 2 percentage point
reduction in binding commitments not to raise tariffs in the future.
It is possible that other types of protection are driving these results. In all
regressions, I include a binary indicator for a positive MFN tariff at the tariff line
level. Australia’s current tariff profile tends to have zero tariffs in products that are
not produced domestically or less frequently imported. Where there is both domestic
production and import competition, positive tariffs are levied. Failure to control for
this confounds the effect of tariff protection on exporting with policymakers’ motive
to protect import-competing sectors. Some lines are subject to non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) and these forms of protection could bias my results if Australia substitutes
NTB protection for applied protection near the binding. I use the ad-valorem equiva-
lent NTB measures from Kee et al. (2009) to construct additional controls. Because
these measures have no time variation, I interact them with a year indicator. These
NTBs slightly reduce the probability a product is traded, but they are not significant
in column 3. A small fraction of tariff lines levy some mixture of specific and ad-
valorem tariffs; I include tariff line indicators for these “complex” tariffs in column 4
of Table 2.2 interacted with year indicators. The added variable is significant with a
positive sign but does not change the main results.
2.3.3 Quantification
I quantify the effects of applied tariff reductions relative to uncertainty reduc-
tions by using the econometric model to predict the number of new products under
different regimes.9 In this exercise, I take the sum of predicted probabilities generated
by the model for each exporter in terms of changes to applied tariffs and bindings.
The exporter-year and industry-year effects absorb a large share of total variation in
the pattern of traded goods. This is not surprising given the well-known, traditional
9A similar quantification exercise is used by Debaere and Mostashari (2010) in a different context.
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roles of technology driven comparative advantage, distance, transport costs and en-
dowment differences in predicting the pattern of trade. Nevertheless, most of these
factors cannot be directly influenced by trade policy, even over the long run. I focus
on comparing the relative impacts of alternative trade policy instruments. I will show
however, that in some scenarios the aggregate impact of trade policy uncertainty is
substantial.
I use the estimates to run policy experiments which compare the scope for new
product creation given the margins of policy adjustment available to Australia in
2004 and 2006. I focus on three channels: setting all applied tariffs to zero, reducing
bindings to zero, or both together. The predicted values of product creation for
2004 and 2006 appear in Table 2.3. For 2004, the model predicts a 6.54% increase
in products, or 2630 new products, if Australia were to set all its remaining MFN
tariffs to zero on a unilateral basis. Relative to the deterministic environment, the
caution effect reduces the number of new products created by 1069 products. The
delay effect is of similar magnitude in terms of products. If Australia reduced all
bindings to the current applied tariffs, eliminating the risk of future “bad news”, the
number of traded products would increase by 2.9 percent, or 1167 products, in 2004.
The remarkable aspect of this effect is that not a single applied policy measure would
need to change. Merely the commitment never to raise tariffs above 2004 or 2006
levels would generate a 3 percent increase in traded products with MFN partners.
The greatest increase in traded products is achieved by reducing tariffs to free trade
levels and binding them through the WTO. Eliminating the motives for both caution
and delay while reducing tariffs would increase the number of traded products by over
12 percent in 2004 or 2006.
A caveat is that these predictions ignore general equilibrium effects. It is pos-
sible that if all trade partners uniformly faced less uncertainty, the level of product
creation would be attenuated by increased competition. This suggests a need for
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future work on theoretical and empirical effects of policy uncertainty in general equi-
librium. While some predicted effects appear to be quite large, it is possible these
product measures actually understate the true level of entry by firms. There is un-
doubtedly within product firm entry. If a product is already traded or becomes traded
due to the policy change, multiple firm entry can only be counted once. But whether
the estimates over- or understate the true impact is less relevant when evaluating the
relative efficacy of reducing unilateral applied tariffs versus reducing uncertainty. As
long the predictions are not systematically skewed toward applied protection or un-
certainty, the relative contribution of uncertainty reductions are at least as effective
as tariff reductions.
2.3.4 Robustness
2.3.4.1 Parameterization of Uncertainty Measures
The uncertainty measure requires a parametric assumption about the elasticity
of substitution given by σ. The strength of using the model based measure is that
it has a clear interpretation in going from the model to the regression specifications.
Results could be sensitive to the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is
σ = 4 when constructing the measures. Table 2.4 reports the results across values
of σ with the baseline specification included for easy comparison in column 2. Signs
and significance are largely unchanged. Moving from high to low values of σ tends to
increase the magnitude of estimated coefficients on the uncertainty measures.
2.3.4.2 Reduced-Form Specification
The model has reduced-form predictions about the elasticity of entry to bindings
that can be used to avoid parameterization of the uncertainty measures. I regress the
traded product indicator on logs of applied tariffs, bindings and their interaction.
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Results with log levels of tariffs and bindings appear in Table 2.5. The elasticity of
entry to the binding is negative and significant. To capture the caution effect, I include
an interaction term for tariffs and bindings in column 2. The positive and significant
coefficient on the interaction indicates that caution is present in the reduced form
specification as well.
2.4 Conclusion
Trade policy is inherently uncertain. I account for this in a tractable model
that delivers clear theoretical predictions for export market entry patterns along with
an estimation strategy. Evidence from Australia suggests that prospective exporters
place weight on the possibility of trade policy reversals. This leads to delay of the
entry decision and less responsiveness on the entry margin. I find that multilateral
policy commitments at the WTO help to reduce this uncertainty and increase product
entry. Within the space of trade policy tools available, policy commitments could
generate nearly as much product entry as unilateral tariff reductions. These results
are important for quantifying the value and modeling the impact of tariff binding
commitments at the World Trade Organization. The evidence of greater product entry
in tariff lines with lower bindings, a key policy instrument for guaranteeing predictable
market access, indicates that these commitments are valuable to exporters.
Several theoretical extensions to the model would be useful in broader contexts.
The first is to extend the model to a general equilibrium framework. As mentioned in
the quantification exercise, the uncertainty reducing benefits of policy commitment
may diminish if all trade partners have more secure market access. But if such effects
are present, then the benefit of multilateral over regional liberalization may be even
greater.
Extending and verifying these results to a broader group of countries and ap-
plications outside of international trade is important. Fortunately the methodology
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developed here, by using product data and model-based uncertainty measures, can
be applied more broadly within international trade applications and to other forms of
policy uncertainty. An important extension is the impact of trade policy uncertainty
on foreign direct investment where sunk costs of opening a production facility are
even higher. Trade policy uncertainty takes many other forms in the world trade
system. Modeling and testing the risk of non-renewal in preferential tariff programs,
temporary trade bans, economic sanctions and the risk of anti-dumping measures are
all subjects for future work.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics –Means with standard deviation in parentheses
2004 2006 Total
Product Traded (binary) 0.133 0.117 0.125
(0.340) (0.321) (0.331)
Applied Tariff(ln) 0.045 0.038 0.041
(0.057) (0.041) (0.050)
Binding(ln) 0.105 0.106 0.105
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Binding Uncertainty 0.194 0.210 0.202
(0.176) (0.188) (0.182)
Complex Tariff 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
NTB AVE (ln) 0.043 0.043 0.043
(0.153) (0.154) (0.154)
Pos. MFN Tariff 0.570 0.574 0.572
(0.495) (0.495) (0.495)
Observations 298,794 302,024 600,818
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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Table 2.2: Probability a product is traded in 2004 and 2006
Dependent Variable: Product Traded (binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal Effects:
Applied Tariff(ln) -0.233∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Binding Uncertainty -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls
Pos. MFN Tariff(binary) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗









Elasticities (at mean of Binding Uncertainty Measure) w. r. t.
Applied Tariff -0.185 -0.185 -0.196
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Binding -0.090 -0.091 -0.089
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Cautionary Effect (p.p.)–Relative to -32.792 -32.976 -31.331
Marginal Effect in Row 1 (5.258) (5.244) (5.025)
Observations 600818 600818 600818 600818
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299
Exporter x Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry(HS4) x Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
σ = 4 for uncertainty measure. See text for description of elasticity calculations.
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Table 2.3: Quantification – cross-section policy experiments in terms of products for
2004 and 2006





1. Reduce all applied tariffs to zero (Deterministic) 3699 3099
(362) (303)
2. Less the Caution Effect (Uncertainty) -1069 -860
(158) (127)
3. Net effect of tariff reduction (A1+A2) 2630 2239
(365) (304)
Growth Rate (Uncertainty) 6.54 6.42
(0.908) (0.872)
B. Binding Reductions
1. Reduce Bindings to Current Applied Tariff(Delay Effect) 1167 1228
(173) (182)
Growth Rate 2.91 3.52
(0.431) (0.522)





C. Tariff and Binding Reductions
Reduce and bind all tariffs to zero (A3+B2) 4868 4326
(432) (384)
Total Growth Rate 12.11 12.39
(1.076) (1.101)
Total Traded Products 34,905 40,194
Notes: Estimates computed from column 2 of Table 2.2. Totals do not add precisely due to rounding error.
Robust standard errors computed via delta method in parentheses.
Growth rates are relative to number of traded products in 2004 and 2006 (bottom row)
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Table 2.4: Robustness across alternative elasticity of substitution parameters (σ) for
uncertainty measure
(1) (2) (3)
Elasticity Parameter: σ = 3 σ = 4 σ = 5
Applied Tariff(ln) -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Binding Uncertainty -0.035∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Pos. MFN Tariff(binary) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 600818 600818 600818
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.299 0.299
Exporter x Year FE YES YES YES
Industry(HS4) x Year FE YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.5: Robustness to reduced-form estimation on log of bindings and tariffs
Dependent Variable: Product Traded (binary)
(1) (2)






Pos. MFN Tariff (binary) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 600818 600818
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.299
Exporter x Year FE YES YES
Industry(HS4) x Year FE YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Log Percentage Change in 1 plus ad-valorem Tariff
Notes: Change in log points from the MFN tariff to the bound tariff in 2004. 100× ln(Bv/τv)
where B, τ = (1 + ad-valorem rate). Bin width is 1.5 log points.
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Figure 2.2: Shift in distribution of profits under a binding reversal in 2004 at applied



























Operating Profits  (Normalized to unity at Free Trade)










Notes: Kernel densities. Profits are normalized to unity at τ = 1. Higher tariffs scale down profits
by τ−σ in the model. I compute the operating profit for all product lines at the applied MFN tariff
in 2004. I then compute profits in 2004 as if there had been reversal to the worst case bound tariffs.
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Chapter 3
Evidence from Portugal’s EC Accession
3.1 Trade Policy Uncertainty and Portugal’s European Integration
The main purpose of this section is to provide some facts and a preliminary
aggregate analysis of Portugal’s European trade integration. We then provide back-
ground information on Portugal’s preferential agreements with various European
countries. The EC accession in 1986 generated considerable export growth towards
those partners and it was characterized by the entry of new firms into those markets
(rather than higher sales per firm). The aggregate evidence is consistent with an
uncertainty-reducing role of EC accession but possibly also with other explanations
thus in section 5 we explore the firm-level predictions.
3.1.1 Overview of Trade Policy toward Portugeuse Firms
Portugal’s market access to its European partners in the 1970s and early 80s
displayed many of the same characteristics associated with uncertainty outlined above.
Prior to joining the European Community (EC), Portugal was a founding member of
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which was signed in 1960. By the late 1960s,
EFTA had achieved free trade in industrial products. When the UK and Denmark left
EFTA in 1972 to joint the EC, the remaining EFTA countries (including Portugal)
signed bilateral agreements with the EC that implemented free trade in industrial
products by 1977.1
Portugal’s trade with neighboring Spain remained highly restricted until the
1The schedules appear inthe GATT submission ”Agreement between the European Communities
and Portugal”, L/3781/Add.1, December 29, 1972.
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EFTA-Spain agreement of 1980. This agreement began a partial liberalization of
Spain’s tariffs against the EFTA countries. In the first phase from 1980-1983, a three
tiered system of reductions on industrial products would reduce tariffs by 25% to 60%
with EFTA partners. Portugal was granted even greater reductions of up to 80%.2
A second phase of reductions over a period of indeterminate length was to
commence in 1984. The EFTA-Spain agreement contained no definite timetable or
scheduled reductions for the second phase. This so-called “dynamic clause” was possi-
bly incompatible with the criteria of Article XXIV of the GATT allowing preferential
trade agreements. It was uncertain at the time if and when further liberalization
would commence. In a working party report to the GATT secretariat on the EFTA-
Spain agreemtn covering Spain’s preferences to Portugal, one member noted that the
agreements
“provided only an expectation that at some point in time the duties
and other regulations of commerce would be eliminated but no specific
provisions existed in this respect. There was a great difference between
an expectation and a specific plan and schedule”.3
By 1984 both Spain and Portugal were in protracted negotiations for acces-
sion to the EC. Notifications to the GATT show that the preferential reductions in
place by 1983 were simply extended and then renewed multiple times by an oversight
committee.4 The Articles of Accession required another round of tariff reductions
between Portugal, Spain and the EC-10 countries and harmonization with the EC
2Details of the reductions can be found in the text of the “Agreement Between the EFTA Coun-
tries and Spain,” signed May 26, 1979 and entering into force on May 1, 1980. Annex P contains
the timetable and list products with tariff reduction for Spain and Portugal. GATT notifications
indicate that these scheduled reductions were implemented as planned (“Agreement Between the
EFTA Countries and Spain, Information Furnished by Parties to the Agreement” L/5465, March 8,
1983).
3“AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EFTA COUNTRIES AND SPAIN, Report of the Working
Party,” L/5405, October 24, 1980, p.3
4Agreement Between the EFTA Countries and Spain, Information Furnished by Parties to the
Agreement” L/5886, October 31, 1985.
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Common Customs Tariff (CCT). The agreement was signed in the middle of 1985
and the accession entered into force on March 1, 1986. Protocol 3 of the Acts of
Accession required Spain to fully liberalize industrial tariffs against Portugal imme-
diately to harmonize with the preferences already granted by the existing EC-10
countries. Spain’s agricultural tariffs were reduced by 12.5% per year with respect
to Portugal and the EC-10, to achieve free trade in most products by 1993. Some
non-tariff measures and quantitative restrictions were not slated for full or partial
liberalization until 1996. Both Spain and Portugal would implement the external
CCT immediately on products with tariffs that were within 15 percentage points of
the CCT. For tariffs outside this range, the CCT was phased in by 1993. The EC-10
countries phased in full liberalization by 1992 of agricultural tariffs against Portugal
at 14.3% per year.
3.1.2 Portugal’s European Trade Integration
Before modelling and estimating the impact of uncertainty it is useful to examine
the broader impacts of these preferences on Portugal’s trade and investment in
exporting. In the recent past Portugal has been a fairly open economy; in 2006
its import and export to GDP ratios were respectively 39 and 31%. But during the
1950’s and 60’s the overall goods trade/GDP ratio only averaged about 30%, rising
above 40% only in the 1970’s and 50% in the 1980’s.5 Between 1985 and 1992 real
exports grew by 90% and imports by about 300%.6 The fraction of firms involved
in trade went from 22% in 1986 to 26% in 1992 and employment in firms that trade
increased by about 200,000.7
The historical impact of European preferential agreements on Portugal’s aggre-
5The 2006 ratio is from Bank of Portugal online statistics. The historical ratios for trade in goods
are calculated from current price data in Pinheiro et al (1997).
6Authors’ calculations based on data from Pinheiro et al, 1997)
7Authors’s calculation from merged information of Quadros de Pessoal and International Trade
statistics available from INE.
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gate trade/GDP ratio is sometimes clear (for instance, imports/GDP rose rapidly
upon EC accession). What is more clear is that these agreements had a strong effect
on the trade orientation towards preferential partners. The trade share with EFTA
countries increased from about 20% in 1960 to 30% in 1973, as shown in Figure 1.8
The figure also reveals that the termination of agreements is important. The exit
of Denmark and the UK (which accounted for half of Portugal’s trade with EFTA)




Figure 2 shows the re-orientation of Portugal’s trade toward its EC preferential
8Source of the trade data: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
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partners starting in 1985. The share with the EC-11 rose from 52% in 1985 to 72% in
1992. If we exclude Spain we still find that the trade share with EC-10 went from 47
to 57% over that period. Also, after the transition period was complete (around 1993)
the trade share flattened and eventually began to fall; this latter fall was driven by
trade with the EC-10 since trade with Spain continued growing and currently stands
at just below 30%. The other interesting point is that Portugal’s initial preferential
agreements with the EC (agreed to in 1972, fully implemented by 1977) and Spain
(early 1980’s) left its trade share nearly unchanged at about 50% between 1972 and
1985.9
The strong increase in trade shares with the EC after 1985 was not merely
a switch away from exporting to other markets. There is strong evidence of trade
creation: total real exports in 1993 were almost twice as high as in 1985 (Pinheiro et
al., 1997). Starting in 1981 we have access to data from the Portuguese census (INE)
that reports trade by Portuguese firms at the transaction level that, to our knowledge,
has never been analyzed for this period. This allows us to examine whether the source
of the growth in trade is related to Portuguese firms entering the preferential markets.
To determine if net entry is differentially larger for preferential markets we
contrast it to the growth in the number of firms exporting to large non-preferential
markets such as the U.S. As the dotted line in Figure 3 shows there was positive and
rather substantial net entry of exporting firms into the US between 1981 and 1985
but almost none between 1985 and 1992. In contrast, the number of Portuguese firms
exporting to Germany (dashed line) grew by 65 log points between 1985 and 1992.10
Entry into the Spanish market was even more pronounced, over 150 log points in the
9We can detect more of an effect during this period if we focus on Portuguese export shares
alone, which go from 50% to 62% in this 13 year period. But export growth is faster after the 1986
accession and the EC share in Portugal exports goes up to 73% in only 7 years.
10Other important Portuguese preferential markets such as the UK displayed a similar trend to
Germany, as did France but the latter exhibiting faster growth post-1985.
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1985-1992 period with an apparent upward break in the trend around 1985.11,12
Figure 3
We get a clearer sense of the relative importance of the entry channel in real
export growth if we decompose the latter into two margins: the growth in the number
of firms and in exports/firm. As figure 4 shows, real export growth to the US was
characterized by increases in both margins prior to 1985, but after that period net
entry is flat and the reduction in exports is largely driven by reductions in average
sales per firm. The picture for Germany is considerably different, with sales per firm
flat while the number of firms grew at the same rate as exports between 1985 and
1988. Spain is similar to Germany, but even more striking, since the pattern holds
between 1985 and 1992 and the growth in real exports is almost 200 log points in
that period.
11Our analysis stops in 1992 for two reasons. First, as discussed above this was the end of the
initial period accession. Second, there was a major change in the data collection procedures in 1993
due to the removal of physical customs barriers within the EC. The new system, Intrastat, is based
on self-reporting and has minimum export value thresholds, both of which imply that the number
of firms in the data in 1993 exhibits a discrete fall that affects only EC partners.
12We focus on net rather than gross entry because currently the data does not contain consistent
firm identifiers for the full period 1981-1992. We do have a set of consistent identifiers before 1985
and another starting in 1986. Using these we find that in 1987 there was 42% growth in the number
of new exporting firms to any market (relative to 1986). The gross entry rate in the period before






The EC accession was not the only notable economic event Portugal experienced
in the 1980’s. Earlier, in August 1983, Portugal completed an agreement with the
IMF to help it resolve a balance of payment crisis. The nominal Portuguese exchange
rate continued to depreciate against the major European currencies until 1990, but
starting in 1985 it experienced some appreciation relative to the US dollar.13 To
account for this and other effects, e.g. in incomes and prices, we can estimate an
aggregate gravity equation for Portuguese exports. This is by now a standard tool
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). We include country effects to account for time
invariant differences in exports between Portugal and each of its partners (distance,
colonial ties, etc.) and year effects to control for Portuguese productivity, nominal
export price or exchange rate changes. We also allow the time effects to differ between
advanced economies and others to control for any differences in the composition of
exports. Moreover, we control for bilateral nominal exchange rates, price deflators in
the import country and their real GDP. By interacting an EC accession time dummy
(=1 for 1986-1992) with the member country dummies (Spain or EC-10) we can then
test if Portuguese exports to these preferential markets grew differentially relative to
other advanced economies.14
We find an increase, reported in Table 3.1, of about 24 log points towards the
EC-10 in the post-accession period that cannot be accounted for by the standard
determinants. That increase is about 5 times larger for Spain. Given our interest
in uncertainty and the role of investment and entry we also go beyond the standard
gravity estimation and use the (ln) number of firms as a dependent variable in column
2.15 These results confirm that the pattern seen in the figures above is robust to vari-
ous controls: the number of firms exporting to Spain and the EC-10 rose significantly
13The aggregate real exchange rate did not exhibit large changes between 1980-1991 according to
the IMF IFS statistics.
14In addition to the EC-10 and Spain these include EFTA countries, US, Canada and Japan.
15Our model will provide a formal justification for using this dependent variable in a gravity
regression. Bernard et al. (2007) present similar type specifications for the U.S.
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relative to other countries after accession. If we include a similar variable for the US
as a falsification test we see no statistically significant increase in net entry, and the
same is true for the EFTA countries.
In column 3 of Table 3.1 we run a similar regression using exports/firm as the
dependent variable and find it increased by only about 6 log points for the EC-10.
The growth of this margin is about one third of the firm entry growth and a similar
ratio holds for Spain. Since these two margins must add up to total exports the
results suggest that net entry was quite important. In fact, if entering, exiting and
continuing firms had similar average sales then the regressions indicate that net entry
accounts for about three quarters of the total export growth to the EC after 1986
that is not explained by standard gravity measures.16
Given the importance of exchange rate volatility in Portugal and the promi-
nence of this channel in discussions of trade and uncertainty we also extended the
specifications to include it (results available upon request). This did not affect any
of the results previously discussed. Moreover, the elasticity of exports with respect
to volatility is fairly small, both for aggregate exports (-0.096) and for firm entry
(-0.07). This is consistent with previous studies that find conflicting and typically
small effects of exchange rate volatility on aggregate trade flows.17 To get a sense
of the magnitudes, a two standard deviation reduction in this variable (1.74) leads
only to a 17 log point increase in exports and 12 in number of firms, which are small
16An alternative decomposition is to focus on the fraction of new exports due to changes in the
average exports of continuers vs. the fraction of new exports due to net entry. The data allows us to
compute this decomposition for 81-85 and 86 onwards but at this point no firm match exists between
85 and 86. This alternative decomposition and the one in the text match if firms that enter and
exit have the same average exports as continuing firms did in the initial period. If, as is likely, new
entrants are smaller, then the true net entry fraction is smaller than 75%. But exiters are also likely
to be smaller, which goes in the opposite direction. We are currently working on the alternative
decomposition for the years where firms are linked to provide additional evidence for the fraction of
new exports due to net entry.
17For a recent review of the academic literature see the IMF report at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/exrate/2004/eng/051904.pdf. The measure we use is
the one the report cites as the preferred one: log(standard deviation of monthly exchange rate
changes).
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fractions of the standard deviations of these variables. Moreover, the exchange rate
variation for most of the EC-10 countries and Spain over this period was below two
standard deviations. So this was clearly not important in generating the export and
firm entry boom we observe.18
In sum, there is strong evidence of an increase in the direction of aggregate due
to accession and that firm entry played an important role even after we control for
standard aggregate determinants. Given that Portuguese exporters already enjoyed
some trade preferences in Spain and zero or close to zero tariffs in the EC-10 this evi-
dence seems puzzling. The model in the next section provides a potential explanation:
the agreement removed policy uncertainty faced by exporters, which we subsequently
test.
3.2 Theory
The model and notational exposition in Chapter 1 center around a set of firms
exporting to a single importing country. For the application to Portugal, we focus
instead on the decision of firms to enter a set of foreign export destination. In order
to maintain consistency of notation in the model and empirical setup, some elements
of the basic setup are repeated in this section.
3.2.1 Demand, Supply and Pricing
The utility function of the representative consumer, U = Qµq1−µ0 , is identical
across countries and defined over a numeraire good, denoted by 0, which is homoge-
nous and freely traded on world markets, and a subutility index defined over differ-
entiated goods Q with constant expenditure share µ. We consider a CES aggregator
18It is still possible that the entry into the euro had stronger effects both because it eliminated
the volatility completely and possibly more permanently than any earlier changes. We do not use
data after 1992 so the results above would not capture this but our approach can be extended to
analyze this interesting question.
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over a continuum of differentiated goods, indexed by v and with mass Ω. For sim-
plicity of exposition we focus on a symmetric structure with common elasticity of








Each country i has a mass of identical consumers and aggregate income equal to Yi.















is the CES price index. The consumer price, piv,
includes any existing trade costs. We focus on ad valorem import tariffs and note
that they are generally not firm specific but rather product or industry specific, and
denote the tariff factor that i sets on the group of products V by τiV ≥ 1 , so free
trade is represented by τiV = 1. Therefore, producers of any v ∈ V receive piv/τiV
where τiV will be unity if the good is produced and sold in i (i.e. we assume no
domestic sales taxes).
We first determine the optimal price and operating profits for each monop-
olistically competitive firm conditional on supplying a market. The marginal cost
parameter, cv, is constant and heterogenous across firms. We can interpret 1/cv as
either labor productivity or the productivity of an input bundle, so given a wage,
we, in the exporting country e, the firms’ marginal cost is wecv. Since our analysis
focuses on firms in a particular exporting country we drop the “e” subscript.
In a deterministic setting the monopolist simply chooses prices (or quantities)
to maximize operating profits in each period, πiv = (piv/τiV − wcv) qiv, leading to the
19We can show that most theoretical and empirical results can be easily extended to a multi-sector
structure that allows for different elasticities of substitution within each sector and across sectors,







The consumer price in country i , piv, reflects the price received by the producer in e
— the markup over cost wcv/ρ — augmented by the ad valorem tariff if the good is
imported.
Substituting revenues into the operating profit expression and simplifying we
obtain
πiv = (τiV )
−σc1−σv Ai (3.4)





, summarizes aggregate conditions, e.g. domestic
wage, w, and foreign demand.
3.2.2 Firm Value, Investment and Export Entry Setup
We focus on how foreign trade policy uncertainty affects the decision to enter
export markets. Therefore, we assume there are no fixed costs to enter or produce
in the domestic market (as in Helpman et al., 2008)). As such, for each group of
products V there exists a mass of firms in the exporting country equal to NV ; all of
which produce for their home market but only a subset of them, to be determined, will
export to any given market.20 As we noted above, these firms are heterogeneous only
in terms of their productivity, which has a cumulative distribution function GV (1/c)
that is strictly increasing.
A firm considering entering a new export market invests and enters if the present




20This simplification does not affect our basic empirical results since, as we will see, our identi-
fication approach controls for industry-time effects and thus accounts for domestic entry into any
particular industry.
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We allow this investment to be destination market and possibly industry-specific in
that firms producing v ∈ V all face the same cost, but this cost may differ for another
set of varieties. In a purely deterministic environment, the discount factor β reflects
only the “true” discount rate R, but it is straightforward to show that the expression
above also applies when operating profits are constant but there is an exogenous
“exit” probability, δ, in which case β = (1 − δ)/(1 + R). This defines a zero profit
cutoff for unit costs as a function of the tariff, cD (τiV ) for firms considering exporting
product v ∈ V to country i









Clearly tariff reductions induce entry since they increase demand and thus allow the
fixed cost investment to be covered even by firms that are less productive. The
elasticity of the cutoff to a once-and-for-all change in τ is −d ln cD/d ln τ = σ
σ−1 . It
is also clear that the cutoff is common to all firms that face a similar tariff and fixed
cost, so for v ∈ V all firms with cv < cDiV (τiV ) enter.21
As I discuss in Chapter 1 there are several potential sources of trade policy
uncertainty that exporters face. Moreover, potential exporters can optimally choose
not just whether to invest but when to do so. Therefore ongoing policy uncertainty
generates an option value of waiting, which can have important effects for investment.
The analysis below applies for each firm in an export country e that is considering
the decision to invest to enter in market i and sell some good v so we drop these
subscripts for simplicity.
Formally, the firm’s decision to enter an export market is modeled as an optimal
stopping problem.22 Firms can be divided into exporters and non-exporters. The
21The cutoff elasticity with respect to tariffs exceeds unity because the tariff is not paid by the
exporter, so profit decreases more rapidly in the tariff than in the unit cost, as seen in (3.4).
22Formally, our approach is similar to the one Baldwin and Krugman (1989). There are some key
differences. First, they focus on exchange rates whereas we analyze trade policy, which as we describe
below has a different stochastic process and is more permanent than exchange rates. Second, they
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value of being an exporter is denoted by Πe and such a firm exits only when hit by a
“death” shock since it has no other fixed costs after it enters.23 Non-exporters enter
a foreign market only when the value of exporting net of the sunk entry costs, K,
exceeds the option value of waiting, Πw. The value of this option in our model arises
from the fact that in the following period conditions may improve and so the firm
may be better off waiting until that occurs and then entering. The investment and
entry decision rule for each firm, identified by its unit cost requirement c, can be
defined as a function of a threshold tariff τ̄ that makes that firm indifferent between
entry and waiting.
Πe(τ̄ , c)−K = Πw(τ̄ , c) (3.7)
Therefore, any tariff τt ≤ τ̄ (c) triggers entry into the export market by any firm with
cost c. To determine this cutoff and the impact of changes in policy uncertainty we
now describe the policy process and define these value functions.
3.2.3 Value of Credible vs. “Incredible” Policies
The prospective exporter’s decision to enter or wait given the current trade
policy τt depends on four value functions. These are: (i) the value of export market
entry today, (ii) the value of exporting following the next policy change for incumbent
exporters, (iii) the value of waiting, and (iv) the value of entry after waiting for policy
to improve. We now briefly describe each of these value functions that apply for each
firm with cost c, which we omit to simplify the notation.
The expected value of starting to export at time t conditional on having observed
focus on homogenous firms whereas we incorporate firm heterogeneity, which allows us to analyze
the affect of policy uncertainty both between and within industries that already have some export
participation.
23While the assumption of no per period fixed costs of exporting may seem extreme, Das et al.
(2007) find these per period fixed costs are negligible, on average, across all sectors analyzed in their
structural model of Colombian exporters.
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τt is
Πe(τt) = π(τt) + β[(1− γ)Πe(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γEtΠe(τ ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock
]. (3.8)
which includes current operating profits upon entering and the discounted future
value. The ex-ante expected value of exporting following a shock, which is given by
EtΠe(τ ′) = Etπ(τ ′) + βEtΠe(τ ′) (3.9)
Notice that this is simply EtΠe(τ ′) = Eπ(τ ′)/ (1− β), which is time invariant and
simplifies the analysis.
We then compute the value of waiting
Πw(τt) = 0 + β[(1− γ)Πw(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γ(1−H(τ̄))Πw(τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock Above Trigger




The conditional expected value of exporting if τ ≤ τ̄ in the last term is given by
EtΠe (τ ′ | τ ′ ≤ τ̄) = Etπ (τ ′ | τ ′ ≤ τ̄) + β [(1− γ)EtΠe (τ ′ | τ ′ ≤ τ̄) + γEtΠe(τ ′)]
(3.11)
This equation is structurally the same as (3.8). The key difference is that profit flows
are evaluated ex-ante at the conditional expected value of exporting for a firm that
enters following a more favorable policy shock.
The set of four equations (3.8),(3.9),(3.10), (3.11) is linear in four unknowns:
Πe(τt), EtΠe(τ ′), Πw(τt), EtΠe (τ ′ | τ ′ ≤ τ̄). Thus we can solve explicitly for the value
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1− β (1− γH (τ̄))
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if τt > τ̄(c) (3.13)
We can now ask what is the value for an exporter of alternative policy changes.
Consider first a situation where governments announce that the current tariff is being
reduced. We will call this a credible policy change or agreement if the exporters
expect it to remain in place, i.e. if γ = 0. We will call it an “incredible” agreement
otherwise, i.e. if it is expected to be revised with probability γ > 0. The first basic
point is that the credible agreement is more valuable for the exporter since the tariff
reduction is permanent, that is
− ∂
∂τt











Πe(τt, c, γ > 0)
(3.14)
The second, and closely related point, is that even if the initial agreement is
“incredible” so γpre > 0, and it has been in place for some time there may still be
considerable value to making it credible, i.e. of having γpost = 0. In these cases the
primary impact of a formal agreement may simply be to eliminate uncertainty. When
the tariff in the initially incredible agreement is low, e.g. if τt = 1, the reduction of
uncertainty increases the value of exporting as shown by this expression
Πe(τt = 1, c, γpost = 0)− Πe(τt = 1, c, γpre > 0) =






This value captures one motive why the recipients of unilateral preferential tariffs
24The expressions for the other two values are given in the appendix.
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spend considerable resources in attempting to make them permanent through formal
PTAs. Examples include GSP preferences provided by most developed countries as
well as European and US special preferences to developing countries. Since the EC-10
and Spain’s preferences toward Portugal prior to 1986 were uncertain, this change in
value captures one of the important channels by which entry into the EC benefited
Portuguese exporters. To determine if uncertainty reduction was an important factor
we now examine the predictions of the model for investment and entry into foreign
markets, which we will then estimate.
3.2.4 Policy Impacts on Investment and Entry
Using (3.13), (3.12) and the expression in (3.7) we can determine the threshold
tariff that would leave any given firm with costs c indifferent between starting to
export or waiting. From an empirical perspective it will be more useful to recast this
in a different way and ask what firms will invest and enter at any given current tariff.
We have assumed that firms can be ranked by their productivity (the inverse of unit
costs 1/c) according to a CDF that is monotone increasing. Therefore for any current
tariff τt we can determine a cutoff cost c
U





A firm with costs equal to cUt is indifferent between investing today and starting
to export or waiting. As will be clear that will also be true this period for all firms
with lower costs if they had not yet started to export. The model has a closed form
expression for cUt in terms of the current tariff. First, we set the difference between
















t )− Eπ(τ | τ ≤ τt, cUt )]
1− β(1− γ)
(3.16)
We combine the expression in (3.16) with the operating profit function in (3.4)
to solve directly for cUt as a function of the current tariff. The full expression is in
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the appendix, after some simplification we obtain
cUt =
[
1− β + βγ∆ (τt)















Note that the deterministic model cutoff, cDt , is a special case which obtains here if
γ = 0. Otherwise, the cutoff condition also depends on the uncertainty term, denoted
by Ut, which captures the frequency of policy shock arrivals and expectations about
future tariffs. We can show that uncertainty in this model generates a lower cutoff,
requiring firms to be more efficient to enter, than a deterministic tariff at the level τt.
In sum, the model predicts that policy uncertainty increases the hurdle for firms
to invest and enter into new markets relative to the deterministic case. This occurs
despite the convexity of operating profits in tariffs. This result along with the fact
that at γ = 0 we obtain the deterministic cutoff implies that increases in uncertainty
lower the cutoff under the option approach at any initial tariff below the maximum.
As an intermediate step to deriving the estimation equation it is useful to record here











which is negative given ∆ (τt) ≤ 1 .
Consider now the impact of applied tariffs on the cutoff. In the absence of
uncertainty that elasticity is simply − σ
σ−1 , as shown for the deterministic case. It is
simple to see that is also the limit value for
d ln cUt
d ln τt
|γ→0. Since most work, theoretical
and empirical ignores the uncertainty component we will take that as our null hy-
pothesis, γ = 0, and test if this uncertainty parameter has any first order effects . To
do so we employ a first order, log linear Taylor approximation to cUt (γt, τt) around
γ = 0 and the original applied policy values (τ0). We provide the derivation in the
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appendix. The general form for any period t is

















where rt captures second and higher order terms of the approximation. This shows
that increasing uncertainty has a first order effect and reduces the cutoff even if we
are initially at γ = 0 (i.e. in the deterministic case). This is true for any trigger value
of the tariff and strictly so if that trigger it is below the maximum tariff. It also holds
for cases when the current applied tariffs are zero, which stresses the point that even
firms that currently, and possibly for some time, have faced zero tariffs may not enter
if there is some chance that policy will be reversed in the future. We also see that
increasing applied tariffs around γ = 0 changes the cutoff by − σ
σ−1 , the deterministic
elasticity.25
3.3 Evidence
We now use the theoretical framework to address two questions. What are the
first order effects of current policy and uncertainty on firm entry into exporting? Do
trade agreements reduce uncertainty? We will address these in the context of Por-
tugal’s accession to the EC in 1986, which, as we argued in section 3.1.2, secured
pre-existing preferences in some goods and lowered tariffs faced by Portuguese ex-
porters. The empirical section of Chapter 3 describes how to compute a theory-based
measure of uncertainty: the profit loss profit term, ∆ (τ); and how to relate the un-
observed cost cutoff to observables, namely firm export decisions. We then describe
25While the applied tariff effect around no uncertainty is similar to the deterministic case, it will
be dampened by the presence of uncertainty. We provide the exact expression in the appendix, but
the intuition should be clear from equation (3.14) in the last section: a reduction in current tariffs
will not lead to as much entry if it may be reversed in the future. This implies that in the presence
of considerable uncertainty, e.g. prior to an agreement, the estimated coefficient on the applied tariff
in the equation above will be biased towards zero. Handley (2010) also shows this effect within a
similar framework but where the tariff distribution H can be constrained by policy commitments.
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the data and implementation; the baseline estimates and their quantification as well
as additional evidence. The baseline estimates follow the model closely and so are
parsimonious, so in the last section we provide robustness tests.
3.3.1 Empirical Approach
3.3.1.1 Measuring policy uncertainty
In general, to construct ∆ (τt) precisely we require a specific probability distri-
bution H. Therefore, we consider a discrete state space for tariffs that is tractable
and covers the main cases that are present in our data. After a policy shock exporters
consider three potential tariff values, low , medium or high.
τt = τs, Pr(τs) = ps for each s ∈ {l,m, h}
We take τl=1 so it captures the many industrial goods that Portugal exported to the
EC free of ad valorem tariffs both after the accession and before it. The high tariff
captures the rate that is applied to GATT/WTO members that did not receive any
preferences. This may somewhat underestimate the degree of uncertainty in these
goods but seems a reasonable approximation of what the Portuguese exporters may
have feared as the worst case scenario. The medium tariff represents an intermediate
level that captures the transitional preferences that were mostly a feature of Spanish
policy towards Portugal prior to the agreement. It is important to stress that the
latter were transitional and could not remain for long since they were not GATT legal,
as we discuss in section 3.1.1. Therefore although we did observe ”medium” tariffs
during the mid 80’s, the Portuguese exporters likely placed a probability close to zero
(pm ≈ 0)that these would remain, since either an agreement would be signed and
tariffs would transition to the low state, or negotiations would fail and no preferences
would remain.
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In the appendix we show that whether the tariff was initially at the high or
medium states we can use the derivation in (1.23) to derive








This is the percentage profit reduction of a shock that moves tariffs from τ0 to the
worst case scenario, which happens with probability ph. The same term applies to
cases when the initial tariff is low and pm is negligible.
26 Alternatively, if we consider
only a two state world, s = h, l the expression above applies to tariffs with either
history.
We model the uncertainty parameter γti by assuming that prior to an agreement
there is a common probability of policy reversal, γpre, and that after an agreement
with a country i (or set of countries) such as the entry into the EC then ECit = 1
and the probability is now γpost. So we use
γti = γpre (1− ECit) + γpostECit (3.20)
We will test if γpost < γpre and subsequently also if γpost = 0.
3.3.1.2 Unobserved cutoffs and firm export entry
While we do not directly observe whether firms have costs above or below the
cutoff, we do observe the number of firms and their export status at the country-
product level. We could then examine the probability of individual firms exporting.
However, our model focuses on variation in policies over time and across products,
and the cutoffs we derived are assumed to be common across some sets of firms. In
26In the appendix we show that if pm were large then there would be an additional term where the
high probability and tariff are replaced by the medium ones. Since, (a) there is no obvious empirical
counterpart for the medium term, (b) it would be highly correlated with the high value and (c) we
have good reasons to believe pm ≈ 0 given these were transitional tariffs that could not be sustained
under GATT rules, we ignore this extra term.
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particular, producers of a variety v exporting to i will all face a tariff that does not
discriminate by firms, but rather by product classification, denoted V , and so those
producers also face the same critical cutoff cUtiV . Therefore we examine the fraction
of exporters in an “industry” V to each country pair.
In the model, all potential exporters of a given good in industry V that have
productivity above the threshold (or equivalently a cost below cUtiV ) will invest and
export good v to i. If that productivity follows a Pareto distribution G (.) with shape











of domestic producers in industry V will actually export to market i.
The empirical counterpart to the fraction of firms exporting at time t to i in
an industry V is simply the observed number of exporters relative to the potential




= lnG(cUtiV ) + utiV (3.22)
where utiV is a random disturbance term due to measurement error. The term can
also capture the potential for “legacy” firms. If demand or cost conditions in earlier
periods had been considerably more favorable this would generate a legacy of firms
that may survive until period t even though they have costs above cUtiV . A sufficient
condition to rule out legacy firms is that cUtiV ≥ max{cUTiV ∀ T < t}, i.e. if current
conditions are better than in the past. In this case, G(cUtiV ) captures the fraction
of firms in the market. In the case of Portugal in the mid-80’s exporting conditions
were improving, as is clear from the observed high entry rates into EC countries.
Therefore, we do not think legacy firms are particularly important for our analysis.
Nonetheless, in the appendix we argue that our approach and results are robust to
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certain instances where legacy firms are present.
3.3.1.3 Baseline model
Our basic estimation equation can then be obtained by substituting (3.20) and
(3.19) into the cutoff expression (3.18); substitute this into the share equation in
(3.22) and use the distribution assumption in (3.21) to obtain for each t, i, V
lnntiV = k
[























+ riV t − ln cV
]
+ lnntV + utiV
We note a couple of relevant points for the estimation. First, it is not obvious how
to measure the potential producers in an industry, moreover for some of our results
it will be useful to know what happens to the number, not just the fraction of ex-
porters, so we move the lnntV term to the RHS and control for it via industry by time
effects. Second, there are three assumptions that we use in the baseline estimation to
identify the effect of uncertainty: (i) the shape parameter k is common across V (but
we allow the other parameter cV to be flexible); (ii) conditional on a policy shock
for the policy in a particular importer we assume that producers share a common ph
among them and across importers. However, they have market specific information
about the impact of that worst case scenario on profits (captured by the tariff uncer-
tainty measure); (iii) the elasticities of substitution are similar across sectors. In the
robustness section we will discuss the impact of relaxing some of these assumptions.
Given these assumptions we can write the estimation equation in terms of vari-
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ables and parameters as follows








+ bτ ln τtiV
+ ati + aiV + atV + ũtiV (3.24)
for each t, i, V where bγ = −γp0h βk1−β captures the impact of uncertainty on entry. In
effect, we estimate the joint probability of a reversal to the high tariff γ × ph, scaled
by kβ
1−β . The coefficient on the applied tariff is bτ = −
kσ
σ−1 . The ax terms represent
country-year, country-industry and industry-year effects that absorb, among other
things, the demand and cost conditions in Ati, the investment cost KiV , the produc-
tivity heterogeneity across industries (cV ) as well as other terms that vary at the
“x” level and were previously included in the remainder term, riV t, and in uiV t. The
remaining part of the disturbance that varies at the iV t level are included in ũtiV .
Since the central question for the estimation is whether the agreement reduced
uncertainty, i.e. γpost < γpre , we focus on testing if bγpost − bγpre > 0 by estimating
(3.24) in differences taking a period after the agreement was implemented and one
before it.








+ bτ∆t ln τtiV
+ ai + aV + ũiV for each i, V (3.25)
In equation (3.25), bγpost − bγpre estimates the change in the probability of a reversal
to the high tariff. If ph is time invariant, then this coefficient measures the change
policy uncertainty coming through γ.
In sum, we are interested in understanding the impact of the EC accession
agreement on investment and entry in export markets by Portuguese firms. To isolate
the impact from trade policy we explore the variation across industries and countries.
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To isolate the uncertainty effect we control for changes in applied tariffs and ask if
there was larger entry in industries that were previously subject to more trade policy
uncertainty. The importer effects address any shocks specific to export markets.
We also control for industry effects in the changes specification to account for, among
other things, the fact that these industries could have been expanding to both markets
for other reasons. Therefore the identification will rely on differential changes in
uncertainty that Portuguese exporters within each industry faced in the EC vs. the
Spanish market.
3.3.2 Data and Implementation
To estimate (3.25) we collect detailed data on trade policy for Spain and the
original EC-10 countries before and after the agreement, as described in more detail
in the data Appendix. So the uncertainty measure varies not only across industries
but also across members of the agreement. For some industries the policy data are
recorded at a fine level of disaggregation, so they could potentially be matched to 6-
digit NIMEXE classifications for the trade data, which includes over 5000 products.
However, we argue this is not the correct level of disaggregation to test the model
for a few reasons. First, the model suggests that we define industries according to
a set of characteristics (such as productivity distribution) that is common across a
set of firms, which is clearly broader than the 6-digit level. Second, even though the
policy is recorded at a fine product level, most of the variation in the policy occurs
across industries, rather than within them. For example, about 80% of the variation
in applied tariffs faced by Portugal in exporting to the EC 10 before the agreement
is accounted for by differences across 2-digit industries (of which there are 99). For
the main uncertainty variable, 75% of the variation is across 2-digit industries. Those
fractions are lower for Spain but still more than half of the variation is accounted for
by cross-industry differences. Third, even in 2-digit industries where there is some
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variation in tariffs, an exporter’s perception of the worst case scenario is likely to be
broader than what is implied by the worst case for a single 6-digit good. This is clear
if he exports more than one good in an industry, but it is relevant even if he exports
a single 6-digit good. To see why note that goods can face tariff changes simply be-
cause they are reclassified. For example, there were product reclassifications in 1983,
1988, 1992, 1996, 2002. Between 1987 and 1988 for example the classification system
changed dramatically with the introduction of the harmonized system. However, the
top level 2-digit classification, the so-called chapters, are actually quite similar even
across these two systems.27 Therefore it seems more reasonable that an exporter of a
good in a 2-digit industry consider the uncertainty for a typical good in that industry
rather than only considering the uncertainty for a particular 6-digit product. 28
To construct the uncertainty measure we first take τhi for a product to be the
ad valorem conventional GATT tariff that country i (EC-10 or Spain) had before the
agreement. If that tariff was not bound in the GATT then we use the autonomous
ad valorem tariff that i applied. We take τ0i to be the tariff that i actually applied
to Portuguese exports in that product before the agreement, where we employ data
on the set of preferences that these countries provided to Portugal, as described in
section 3.1.1. We then construct the uncertainty measure in (3.19) using elasticity
values that are consistent with the data for these countries (σ between 2 and 4). In
the robustness section we provide supporting evidence for this choice of elasticity and
show the results are robust to alternative values. We then aggregate this measure
and the applied tariff to the 2-digit industry level using a simple average.
The tariffs that Portuguese firms exporting to Spain faced in the years 1985 and
27Thus another advantage of defining the relevant industry at the 2-digit level is that it will allow
future work to examine the uncertainty impacts even after the product classification changes in 1988.
28If we were to run the model at the 6-digit level there would be a large number of 0’s. Since
our estimation equation is in logs we would eventually have to drop those categories, which could
be those where uncertainty was most important. In a different context, Handley (2010) recasts the
model at the detailed product level using a latent variable specification that can handle the zeros.
But as we just argued, policy uncertainty varies at a higher level in this application and would be
unlikely to explain a lot of variation for within industry participation.
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1987 appear in Table 3.2. The typical industry in Portugal enjoyed preferential tariffs
that were nearly 50% below the tariff levied on the rest of the world. Figure 7 also
shows that this difference is not driven by any one set of goods but occurs along the
full distribution of tariffs, which is shifted towards zero for Portuguese exporters (blue
line) relative to the rest of the world (red). If Portugal were to lose these preferences,
the typical exporter would see his profits reduced by over 16% per annum. With
respect to the EC-10, the table shows Portugal enjoyed lower preferential tariffs by
1985 but the proportional loss in profits was nearly as high as in Spain at 15%. The
magnitude of EC tariff reductions in 1987 is small since tariffs in industrial products
were already zero prior to accession.
Figure 7
3.3.3 Baseline Estimates
Table 3.3 provides estimates of the parameters in (3.25). We find that firm entry
is negatively affected by applied tariffs, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, entry
was strongest in the industries that initially faced more uncertainty. In particular,
bγpost − bγpre > 0, which according to our model implies that the agreement reduced
uncertainty, i.e. γpost < γpre, and this lead Portuguese exporters to enter the EC and
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Spanish markets.
One potential concern with the results in column 1 is that ad valorem tariffs were
only one part of the protection faced by Portuguese exporters. If applied protection
that used other instruments fell by more in those industries where there was higher
uncertainty this would bias the estimates. Therefore in column 2 we control for
changes in specific tariffs and in column 3 for changes in “non-tariff barriers.”29 Both
have the predicted negative sign but they are insignificant. Neither affects the baseline
results for uncertainty and applied ad valorem tariffs.30 The results are robust to other
changes, which we discuss in detail in the following section.
The theory has implicitly assumed single product firms. However, it can be
easily re-interpreted as applying to a firm’s decision to invest in order to introduce
a new product into a country. That cost may be present even if the firm already
sells another good in that market. If most firms are single product, this should
not affect our results, but if the trade expansion was driven by multi-product firms
introducing new products then the results in table 3.3 would understate the impact
of the uncertainty reduction. We observe in the data that the typical Portuguese
exporter sells only two types of products (at 6-digit Nimexe) both in 1985 and 1987.
We do not expect these multi-product exporters to affect our results (the average
number is also approximately unchanged at about 6), but we can test this directly by
re-estimating (3.25) using the number of varieties (i.e. total number of product firm
combinations in an industry). The results in Table 3.4 confirm the baseline estimates
both in terms of magnitude and significance.
29To construct these measures we use information in the tariff schedules on whether a product
line was subject to specific tariffs, special import authorization or other conditions that were not
translated into an advalorem tariff. As is standard in this type of literature we construct a coverage
ratio measure: fraction of products in industry V that are subject to a particular measure (e.g.
specific tariff, or other NTB) and took the difference before and after the agreement.
30Note that the policy measures vary across industry and for Spain vs. the EC-10 but not within
the EC-10. To address this we also re-estimated the standard errors allowing for clustering with ar-
bitrary correlation across EC-10 countries within each industry , and similarly for spain. This makes
no difference to the statistical significance reported in the table. The same applies to subsequent
results in tables 4 and 5.
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3.3.4 Quantification
We now provide some quantification of the impact of the alternative policy
dimensions—applied tariffs and uncertainty—on both net entry and the value of ex-
porting.
One way to compare the relative impact of the policies is to ask how much
variation in net entry they explain. For the full sample we find that a one standard
deviation reduction in applied tariffs leads to a 0.14 standard deviation increase in en-
try whereas for uncertainty that effect is 0.4, which is almost 3 times larger (0.4/0.14).
If we focus on the EC-10, we find that uncertainty is 5.8 times more important than
applied tariffs since there was little variation in the applied tariffs in the EC-10 before
or after acession.
Since the applied tariffs went to zero post-accession and, as we will argue below,
so did uncertainty, we can also ask what the estimates imply for the relative impact
of the removal of the applied tariffs and uncertainty. The elimination of applied
tariffs only generated about 4% growth in entry overall, 2% into EC-10 (their mean
reduction was only 0.7 p.p.) and 20% for Spain (mean reduction of about 7 p.p).
The elimination of uncertainty, on the other hand, generated a 31% growth in entry
overall, similar in both Spain and the EC-10. The overall growth explained by both
these effects is about 35%, which roughly matches that of the sample (33%).31
We can also quantify the impact of policy on exporting profits. It is simple to
do so for applied tariffs, since the elasticity of operating profits with respect to τ is
simply −σ and the same is true for the value of exporting around γ = 0. So if after
the agreement the EC and Spain were to raise tariffs back up to pre-levels and we
assumed there was no uncertainty then the percent reduction in profits of Portuguese
exporters would be simply −σ∆ ln τ ≈ 4.2%, assuming σ = 3 and using the sample
31Naturally, there are other factors affecting the sample value, some of which are accounted for
by the country and industry effects, while others unexplained by the model.
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mean tariff change of 1.4%. The impact is larger for exports to Spain (≈ 20%) given
their higher initial tariffs.32
To compare the figure above with the impact of uncertainty, we first recall our






/τ−σ0V as the percentage profit reduction from
a shock that moves tariffs from τ0 to the worst case scenario. This variable ranges
from zero to 44% and, as the summary statistics in table 2 indicate, its average is
about 16% (similar for the EC-10 and Spain). For the many industries in which the
EC was already providing full preferences to Portugal the pre-accession mean is 19%.
Once we accumulate these values over time we can understand why exporters may be
reluctant to pay a sunk fixed cost to invest that would have to amortized over a long
period of time.33
To quantify the uncertainty reducing impact of the agreement on the value of
exporting we now use our baseline estimates. The counterfactual we are interested
in mirrors the one described above for the applied tariff. Namely, we ask what is the
percent change in the value of exporting if we were to reverse the uncertainty effect
of the agreement but maintain current tariffs at free trade. To do so, we divide the
difference in the exporting value function derived in (3.15) by Πe(τt = 1, γpost = 0) to
obtain
−Πe(τ = 1, γpost = 0)− Πe(τ = 1, γpre > 0)
Πe(τ = 1, γpost = 0)
= − βγpre
1− β(1− γpre)








32This assumes σ = 3 and provides intermediate values to the alternative cases σ = 2, 4. While
the estimated impact on profits is clearly sensitive to the σ value, the relative magnitude when we
compare to the impact of uncertainty is less so.
33We think these may be underestimates for some industries of the true loss in profit if a bad
shock hits, for the following reason: to obtain these values, we must take τhiV to be an observed
tariff that is imposed on the rest of the world. While this captures a situation where Portugal loses
its preferences, it is an underestimate relative to a worst case scenario where the importer raises
temporary protection via other trade policies, e.g. anti-dumping.
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where the last line uses the definition of operating profit and the approximation is
exact in a two-state world (since in that case Eπ(τ ′) = (1− ph)π (1)− phπ(τh)).
We can use our estimates in Table 3.3 to back out a measure of− (γpre − γpost) ph,





Using the structure of the model we can provide an estimate of the change in the
probability of a policy shock that generates the worst case scenario. In Table 3.3
we estimate bγpost − bγpre = (γpre − γpost) phk β1−β and bτ = −
kσ
σ−1 so we can calculate







. We use σ = 3, the value used to construct
the uncertainty measure and a discount factor β = 0.9. We obtain that the change in
probability was about 0.24 or 24 percentage points. First, we note that it is striking
that the result is within the admissible range [−1, 1] since nothing in the estima-
tion ensures that would be the case. Second, this seems to be a significant but not
unreasonably large effect.34
We can now compute (3.26). Since the latter assumes γpost = 0 (and we will
provide evidence below that supports this), our previous calculation implies that
γpreph=0.24 and so γpre and ph are each bounded to be at least 0.24. Therefore
we obtain that the change in the value of exporting if the uncertainty effect of the
agreement were reversed is at least 4.1% (= 0.9
1−0.9(1−1)0.24 × 0.19, when ph = 0.24
and γ = 1) but may be as high as 13% (= 0.9
1−0.9(1−0.24)0.24 × 0.19, if ph = 1 and
γ = 0.24). Given our interpretation of γ as the arrival rate of shocks it seems unlikely
that exporters expected a large shock that would lead to all policies being reviewed
every year so an intermediate value of γ = 0.5 seems more reasonable and implies an
effect equal to 7. 5% (= 0.9
1−0.9(1−0.5)0.24 × 0.19). This indicates that the value of the
agreement for Portuguese exporters attributable to the uncertainty reduction alone
34Recall that β = (1 − δ)/(1 + R) so our assumption is equivalent to alternative reasonable
combinations of these parameters such as a real interest rate R = 0.03 (average for Portugal in 1983-
1995 period) and δ = 0.08. For a reasonable range of alternative discount factors (β ∈ (0.85, 0.95)
we continue to obtain reasonable values for the change in probability ranging from 12-39 percentage
points. No assumptions are required on k since it cancels.
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is almost twice as large as the value generated by applied tariff changes.
3.3.5 Additional Evidence
If γpost is zero then our estimate of 0.24 above also captures exactly γpreph, the
level effect of uncertainty before the agreement. If that is the case we should find a
negative impact of uncertainty on the level equation prior to the agreement and that
coefficient should be similar in magnitude to the one estimated in differences. To test










+ bτ ln τ0iV + ai + aV + ũ0iV for each i, V (3.27)
The key difference is that we can no longer include industry by importer effects
(although we can and do include industry effects). In terms of the structural model
this amounts to a restriction that lnKiV be additively separable into an importer and
industry component and a random disturbance uncorrelated with tariffs. Column 1
in table 5 estimates this and indicates that bγpre = −4 which is nearly identical to
our estimate for − (bγpost − bγpre). The results for varieties (column 3) have a similar
implication. This suggests that the impact of uncertainty on entry we estimate in the
baseline is coming from the elimination of that uncertainty.35 We also obtain more
direct evidence of this when we run the equation above but pool all years 1983-1987
and allow the uncertainty effect to be different post agreement, we then find that
bγpost = 0 and bγpre < 0 and significant. So the interpretation of the change effect
estimated in the baseline as simply capturing −bγpre is reasonable.
35The results are also consistent with another prediction from the theory: if there is uncertainty
in the period before the agreement then the tariff impact on entry is attenuated and if this effect
is large enough it will bias down the first order effect of the tariff that is estimated prior to the
agreement. This can explain why the magnitude of the tariff impact in this estimation is lower and
less precise and indicates one reason why estimates of the impact of policy changes that focus on
the applied policy alone and are done prior to the agreement can understate their true impact.
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Table 3.5 also indicates the importance of using firm level data to detect these
effects and provides some additional evidence for the model. It runs a similar regres-
sion for the period prior to the agreement using total exports (column 5). It finds no
significant effect of the uncertainty measure. We investigate this in column 2. We can
decompose total exports into an extensive margin (e.g. number of firms or variety)
and an intensive one (average sales/firm or variety). When we do so the effect of any
given variable x on the log of total sales to a destination can be decomposed into the
sum of the effects on each of these margins
∂
∂x









The theory predicts that uncertainty depresses entry, as we have verified, but
also that the impact should not be the same for the intensive margin. It predicts that
we should observe higher sales per firm in industries where uncertainty is higher. The
intuition is as follows: in industries with higher uncertainty only the more productive
firms enter and sell, as the cutoff equations showed. Moreover, as we can see from
(??), sales are higher for more productive firms. That selection effect is visible in the
positive impact of uncertainty on the intensive margin in columns 2 and 4 of Table
3.5. However, it is not statistically significant, perhaps because it is attenuated at
this level of aggregation.
The fact that applied tariffs are insignificant prior to the agreement, as in Table
3.5, but significant in changes, Table 3.3, is also consistent with the model. It supports
the prediction that the uncertainty prior to the agreement attenuate applied tariff
impacts, as shown for the value of exporting in (3.14) and for the cutoff directly in
the appendix. This can help explain why ex-ante estimates of tariff preferences on
trade often underestimate the ex-post impact of PTAs.
The figure below also provides direct evidence that new exporters in 1987 were
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smaller than continuing ones, as the theory would predict. It would also be interesting
for future work to examine whether the size distribution of this cohort of new exporters
in 1987 evolves towards that of previously existing exporters. We may expect the two
to converge but the interesting question is how fast and through what mechanism.36
Figure 8
3.3.6 Robustness
We now discuss some robustness tests of the baseline results.
Column 3 of Table 3.3 adds the change in the standard deviation of the tariff
faced by Portugal in each industry, i.e. ∆ (stdev ln τtiv) where v ∈ V . There are
two possible motivations for this control. First, one may argue that our model is
misspecified and for some reason the exporters care not only about the mean of
the applied tariff in an industry but also its dispersion, particularly since we are
aggregating firms up to the industry level. To the extent that our uncertainty variable
includes some nonlinear transformation of the applied tariff it may be capturing
36One possibility is selection: there is a larger share of less productive (and smaller) firms that
are thus more likely to exit. Other alternatives include growth of the entrants either by learning
or by overcoming financial constraints. Cabral and Mata (2003) provide evidence for the financial
constraints explanation but their focus is on employment size of all Portuguese manufacturing firms
rather than sales size for exporters.
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some of that potential effect. The second argument would be that our measure of
uncertainty is incorrect and that perhaps the more intuitive measure of change in
uncertainty is ∆ (stdev ln τtiv). This variable is insignificant and does not change the
value or significance of the theoretically based uncertainty measure.37
We now provide some supporting evidence for our use of common elasticities
and investigate if the results are sensitive to it. There are two assumptions: first,
the typical elasticity within industry V is similar to the typical elasticity in another
industry. Below we provide some direct evidence based on estimated elasticities that
supports this assumption. Second, the elasticity of substitution across industries is
similar to the typical elasticity within them. We do not have estimates for cross
industry elasticities to fully justify this second assumption and thus we examine
directly whether the results are robust to it.
The elasticity of substitution across industries is possibly lower than within
industries. Our model can be extended to accommodate this. In particular, if we
assume that the subutility index Q in (3.1) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator with shares
µV /µ then the elasticity of substitution across industries is unity (so smaller than σ)
and the key difference for our model would simply be that the price index is now PiV
, which is defined only over the varieties in each industry V . Therefore, we should
rewrite the A term as follows





Our baseline estimation is in differences and we can show that a number of
components that this alternative specification of demand introduces are differenced
out. To see this clearly suppose we can rewrite the price index as a product of four
terms, PitV = PitPiV PtV pitV , which reflect variation that is only country-time (Pit),
37We also find that the applied tariff effect is slightly higher and more precise, suggesting that
exporters care about both dimensions of applied policy.
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country-industry (PiV ) or industry-year specific (PtV ) and the last term, pitV , which
can vary along all three dimensions. If we consider changes in lnAitV we then have
∆t lnAitV = (σ − 1) ∆t ln pitV +
[




The key thing to note is that in terms of our differenced estimation equation
(3.25) the industry and country effects continue to capture all the variation in the
costs and demand (Yit (wt)
1−σ) and also a substantial part of the variation in the price
index, namely ∆t (lnPitPiV PtV ). We are left with the residual variation in the price
index, ∆t ln pitV . This is only an issue for our estimates to the extent that it may be
correlated with the policy measures. Recall that these price indices reflect the prices
of all varieties sold in those industries in country i. Therefore it will be dominated by
the domestic varieties and imports from countries other than Portugal since Portugal
is a relatively small exporter. Therefore we do not think that Portugal’s expansion
into their markets had a substantial direct effect on those price indices ∆t ln pitV .
However, there may be omitted variable bias if a third factor affected these indices
and was correlated with the changes in policy faced by Portugal. The most obvious
candidate would be if the EC-10 or Spain were simultaneously reducing their tariffs
on the rest of the world and those reductions were correlated with the policy changes
they were implementing for Portugal. This was not the case for the EC-10 external
tariff in the period we consider. However, Spain was reducing its external tariffs
on the rest of the world (to converge to the European Common tariff) and these
reductions were correlated to the ones faced by Portugal. Therefore we use changes
in Spain’s tariffs to the rest of the world to proxy for ∆t ln pitV .
The results that control for industry and country specific price index changes are
presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.3. We find a positive relationship between
the price index and entry. This is as predicted by the theory: a decrease in the
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price index in an export market makes Portuguese exporters less competitive and
thus lowers entry. This effect is insignificant whether we use log changes (column
5) or add a quadratic term to account for the non-linearity of the price index in
tariffs (column 6). More importantly, controlling for these effects does not change the
baseline results regarding uncertainty or the applied tariff effects. The same is true
if in addition to these price index terms we also include all the other applied policy
controls in columns 2,3 and 4. Since these controls were individually and jointly
insignificant we generally focus on the baseline results without them.
We now examine our assumption that the typical elasticity within industries
is similar across 2-digit categories. Thus far the estimates assume an elasticity of
substitution of σ = 3. This is based on our calculations using the sub-sample of
estimates from Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) for Spain and the other EC-10
countries (except for Greece, Belgium and Ireland, which were not in their sample).
The median for these countries over all industries is 3.4 and the mean is 4.5. Since they
estimate the elasticity at a more disaggregated level (hs-4) than what we use (roughly
hs-2), it is possible their estimates are upper bounds on the 2-digit elasticities. To
test if our results are sensitive to this we re-estimated the baseline results in Table
3.3 using σ = 2, 4 and found no significant changes (see Table 3.6).
We can also provide evidence for one of our simplifying assumptions in the
model and baseline estimation: similar σ across countries and industries. While this
elasticity is not constant within several 2-digit categories, it turns out not to vary
that much across those broad industries. For example, if we take the estimates of σ
at the hs-4 level for Spain we find that only 10% of its variation occurs across 2-digit
industries. There is also not considerable dispersion across countries: the median
elasticity across all hs-4 categories ranges only from 2.8 in Spain to 3.9 in Austria.
Moreover, they are highly positively correlated across countries.38 There is also not
38For example, if we take the parameter on applied tariffs that we assume to be constant,
σiV / (σiV − 1), for each industry V in Spain and regress it on the median value for that indus-
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a lot of dispersion in the typical elasticity across 2-digit industries in these countries.
As we noted the overall median is 3.4 and, in 90 out of the 93 industries for which
we have data, the median (over European countries) of σV is between 2.2 and 4.8,
only 3 industries have higher values: 5.5-6.3. Given these estimates are subject to
measurement error it is unlikely that there would be significant statistical differences
between most of them. Nonetheless we also re-estimated the baseline specification
dropping the three industries with higher elasticities (Nimexe codes 18, 47 and 87)
and verified the results are unchanged.
Finally, we note that the variation that does exist across industries is not in
any obvious group. For example, industries 1-14 (basic agricultural products) have a
median elasticity of 4—only somewhat higher than the overall sample. One potential
concern with the agricultural products is that they are subject to non-tariff barriers
and a non-negligible fraction of industries and thus about 22% of the sample. So they
could bias our results if these NTBs were correlated with our uncertainty measure
before the agreement and removed after. One way to address this is to control for
NTBs directly. We did so in table 3.3 and verified the results did not change. One
may also object to applying a monopolistic competition framework to agricultural
goods and argue that they should be dropped altogether. We are agnostic about this
but nevertheless when we do drop agricultural goods we still find that uncertainty
has an effect that is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline case (for
number of firms of varieties). However, the applied tariff coefficient is now less than
half in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This is not surprising since the tariff
reductions by the EC mostly occurred in those agricultural products so the products
that remain in the sample were ones where Portugal was already receiving significant
tariff concessions. This again stresses that uncertainty reduction was a key motive
for entry.
try across the EC-10 countries we obtain a coefficient of 1.2 with a s.e. of about 0.2.
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3.4 Conclusion
The paper provides a framework to study the effect of trade policy uncertainty
on firm investment and export decisions. Using this framework we find evidence that
Portugal’s EC accession in 1986 generated a significant reduction in the uncertainty
its exporters faced in EC countries. By combining the insights from a dynamic model
with detailed trade policy we can compute a trade uncertainty measure that indicates
that Portuguese exporters stood to lose about 16% of exporting profits if they lost
their preferences in the EC-10 or Spanish markets. Combining this with firm entry
data we estimate that exporters thought such an event had a real probability of
occurring before 1986 (24%) but not after. This generated considerable investment
and firm entry into Spain and the EC-10, more so than the applied tariff changes
themselves. We also showed that firm entry was an important margin of growth
during this period.
We now highlight some interesting implications of the theoretical and empirical
results for policy and future research. Accession to the EC lowered average trade
barriers and uncertainty surrounding them for foreign exporters to Portugal as well.
This is obvious for the EC exporters but is also true for the rest of the world because
Portugal’s high tariffs had to be reduced and harmonized with the EC.39 Therefore,
the EC accession should have led to a marked improvement in market access for for-
eign exporters to Portugal. The aggregate data is consistent with this prediction since
it shows that real imports increased almost three times between 1985 and 1992. The
growth was quite high for consumption, investment and intermediate goods, which
indicates that both consumers and firms may have benefited from it.40 New trade
39Protection in Portugal had been both high and variable, in addition to tariffs that were about
17-20% in the typical industry, there were also several non-tariff barriers in the early 1980’s aimed
at constraining imports to address the external deficit.
40Further work is required to determine the role of trade policy but the data suggest that this
import boom was not simply an income effect. First, imports grew much faster than GDP. Second,
the nominal prices in escudos for total imports and intermediates remained approximately unchanged
between 1985-1992 despite the nominal depreciations, which would tend to make imports more
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theory and recent estimates highlight the role of new imported intermediates in in-
creasing firm productivity. So it would be interesting to test if trade agreements, such
as Portugal’s EC accession, or more generally trade reforms affect the productivity
of importing firms via reductions in uncertainty or applied tariffs. Another impor-
tant issue is the impact of the agreement on foreign direct investment, which involves
substantial sunk costs and is subject to much policy uncertainty.
Our framework can also be extended to analyze the interaction of trade with
other sources of uncertainty, such as exchange rates. While we did not find much
evidence of the impact of exchange rate volatility in the 1981-1992 period, these
effects may have become more important during the 1990’s during the lead up to
adoption of the Euro. One may also examine if trade policy effects are stronger
relative to countries with lower exchange rate volatility. These second order effects
can be estimated by extending our approach to include interactions of measures of
uncertainty in trade policy and the exchange rate.
Our results also have policy implications for the world trade system more
broadly. First, as we describe in section 3.1, many countries receive unilateral pref-
erential tariffs that are subject to the discretion and uncertainty of policy making.
These programs share some of the characteristics that Portugal’s preferences with
the EC-10 and Spain did before 1986. Thus our results provide one reason why these
programs are not always successful in promoting trade and investment and how this
may change if those preferences are secured through formal PTAs. Second, while
formal PTAs may reduce uncertainty for members, they are likely to increase it for
the majority of countries that are non-members and will face increased competition.
Our results suggest why this systemic effect of PTAs may be quite important: by re-
ducing uncertainty the PTAs expand trade between members by more than expected.
Moreover, that expansion is driven by entry, which further adds to the uncertainty of
expensive. This downward pressure on prices suggests entry of new foreign exporters, which is
consistent with a reduction in trade barriers and uncertainty.
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non-members who must face competition from new products and firms.
In conclusion, our results highlight why and how much trade policy uncertainty
affects investment and entry into new markets. While credibility is often mentioned
as an important component of a policy reform, it is generally difficult to measure its
impact. To the extent that our approach and results do just that they may be of
broader interest to economists and policy makers interested in evaluating the impact
of other policy reforms on firm-level decisions.
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Table 3.1: Portuguese Export Growth Margins 1981-1992
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable (ln): Exports Number of Firms Exports/firm
EC-10*Post 86 0.239*** 0.182*** 0.0573
[0.0595] [0.0460] [0.0766]
Spain*Post 86 1.231*** 0.965*** 0.266**
[0.130] [0.0932] [0.116]
US*Post 86 -0.103 -0.152 0.049
[0.132] [0.0952] [0.0924]
EFTA*Post 86 0.137** 0.068 0.069
[0.064] [0.045] [0.079]
Real Importer GDP (ln) 1.208*** 0.628*** 0.580***
[0.259] [0.117] [0.224]
Importer Price Index (ln) 0.165** 0.0501 0.115**
[0.0668] [0.0365] [0.0546]
Exchange Rate (ln) 0.163** -0.0188 0.182***
[0.0670] [0.0341] [0.0554]
Observations 1590 1590 1590
Adj R2 0.912 0.967 0.682
Margins of Growth Decomposition
EC-10 1 0.76 0.24
Spain 1 0.78 0.22
Notes:
Includes dummies for country, year and year*advanced country.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05
Sample: Aggregate values to each country of destination where data is available.
See the appendix for variable description and sources and Table B1 for summary
statistics.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for firm-level baseline regressions
EC-10 Spain Total
Change in No. Firms 24.7 91.1 32.9
(48.70) (62.55) (55.10)
Pre Tariff (Portugal) 2.45 7.89 3.13
(5.40) (5.10) (5.66)
Pre Tariff (GATT) 7.95 14.1 8.67
(4.20) (7.75) (5.14)
Post Tariff (Portugal) 1.79 1.32 1.74
(3.96) (3.51) (3.91)
Tariff Change (Port) -0.65 -6.56 -1.39
(1.44) (4.78) (2.90)
NTM Share Change 0.00 -18.66 -2.32
(0.00) (25.44) (10.85)
Specific Tariff Share Change 0.00 -3.01 -0.37
(0.00) (7.45) (2.80)
Price Index Proxy Change (ln) 0.00 -1.52 -0.19
(0.00) (2.06) (0.88)
SD of Price Index Proxy change 0.00 -0.96 -0.12
(0.00) (0.85) (0.44)
Proportion of Profits Lost if Preference Reversed
15.40 16.00 15.50
(11.10) (9.54) (10.92)
Observations 640 91 731
Notes:
Means of variables in percentage points. Standard deviations in parenthe-
ses.
Tariffs are natural logs of 1 plus ad-valorem tariff aggregated to the indus-
try level evaluated in 1985 (pre-accession) and 1987 (post-accession).
Profit loss computed for an elasticity of subsitution of σ = 3. We normalize
the loss measure in regressions by dividing it by by σ − 1.
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Table 3.3: Firm entry growth into EC-10 and Spain (by industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable (ln): Change in Number of Firms
Uncertainty
Measure
3.952** 3.857** 3.975** 3.653** 4.223** 3.848**




-2.719** -2.783** -2.655** -3.385*** -3.117** -2.847*
























Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731





-0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23
Notes:
All specifications include country and industry effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Sample: Spain and EC 10 countries, 1987-1985
Parameters: For uncertainty measure and computing probability of reversal, σ = 3, β = 0.90







. See Section 5.4
for details.
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Table 3.4: Firm-product growth into EC-10 and Spain (by industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent
variable (ln):
Change in Number of Varieties (Firm*Product)
Uncertainty
Measure
4.399** 4.301** 4.431** 4.351** 4.752** 4.415**
[1.844] [1.884] [1.858] [1.914] [1.929] [2.151]
Applied Tariff
Change (ln)
-3.006** -3.072** -2.919** -3.113** -3.520*** -3.279*























Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731





-0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
All specifications include country and industry effects
Sample: Spain and EC 10 countries, 1987-1985
Parameters: For uncertainty measure and computing probability of reversal, σ = 3,
β = 0.90








Section 5.4 for details.
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Table 3.5: Pre-Agreement (1985) Intensive and Extensive Margins of Firms and Firm-
Products












Uncertainty -4.064** 2.435 -4.711** 3.082 -1.629
Measure [1.829] [4.841] [2.299] [4.394] [6.190]
Applied Tariff
(ln)
-1.426 -3.688 -1.331 -3.783 -5.113
[1.952] [2.760] [2.412] [2.461] [4.351]
Observations 781 781 781 781 781
R-squared 0.869 0.569 0.864 0.558 0.722
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
All specifications include country and industry effects
Sample: Spain and EC 10 countries, 1985
Parameters: For uncertainty measure and computing probability of reversal, σ = 3, β = 0.90
Table 3.6: Firm entry growth into EC-10 and Spain (Robustness across σ)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable (ln): Change in the Number of Firms
Uncertainty Measure 2.721** 3.952** 4.823**
[1.209] [1.716] [2.051]
Applied Tariff Change -2.686** -2.719** -2.751**
[1.184] [1.182] [1.180]
Observations 731 731 731
Adj R2 0.389 0.389 0.39
σ 2 3 4
Change in Probability of Policy Reversal -0.23 -0.24 -0.26
Notes:
All specifications include country and industry effects
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Sample: Spain and EC 10 countries, 1987-1985.
Parameters: For uncertainty measure and computing probability of reversal,




A.1 Value functions and stochastic cutoff condition
Deriving the full set of value functions is a basic application of linear algebra.
The solutions to the set of equations is
V 1(τt) =
π(τt)[1− β(1− γE[π(τ ′)])]
[1− β(1− γ)](1− β)
EV 1(τ ′) =
E[π(τ ′)]
1− β
V 0(τt) = βγH(τ1)
(1− β)E[π(τ ′) | τ ′ < τ1]− βγE[π(τ ′)]− (1− β)[1− β(1− γ)]Ke
[1− β(1− γ)][1− β(1− γH(τ1))]
EV 1(τ1 | τ < τ1) =
βγE[π(τ ′)]− E[π(τ ′) | τ ′ < τ1](1− β)
(1− β + βγ)(1− β)
A.2 CDF of bound tariff distribution




τ if τ ≤ B
B if τ > B.





if τ ≤ B
0 if τ > B,
and H2(τ) =

1 if τ ≤ B
0 if τ > B.
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A.3 Profit Loss Term ∆(τt)
A.4 ∆ (τt) ≤ 1





























(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt) +H(τt)τ−σt
]
/τ−σt
Then to show that ∆ (τt) ≤ 1, I take the difference D of the numerator and denomi-
nator in the final line above
D =
[
(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt) +H(τt)τ−σt
]
− τ−σt
= (1−H(τt))[E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)− τ−σt ]
≤ 0
The inequality follows because τ−σt is always greater than E(τ
−σ | τ > τt). When the
current tariff is at the maximum of the support of H(τ) such that τt = τh, then the
difference in brackets and the term (1−H(τt)) are both zero.
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(1−H(B))B−σ + [H(B)−H(τt)]E(τ−σ | τt < τ < B) +H(τt)τ−σt
τ−σt
(A.1)
A.6 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
PROPOSITION 1 [Caution] The entry cutoff cU is less elastic with respect to











As described in the main text, the proof consists of two parts. First, I show that the
expected profit loss of a bad shock is decreasing in the current tariff τt. Second, I
show the stochastic elasticity is proportionally less than the deterministic elasticity.
(1) ∂∆(τt)
∂τt
≥ 0 implies the proportion of profits lost in a tariff reversal, ∆(τt)− 1, is
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reduced as tariffs increase.
∂∆(τt)
∂τt
= τt[−τ−σt h(τt) + h(τt)τ−σt − σH(τt)τ−σ−1t ]/τ−σt
+ τt[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt) +H(τt)τ−σt ](στσ−1)
= τt[−σH(τt)τ−1t ] + στσ[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt) +H(τt)τ−σt ]
= στσ[−H(τt)τ−σt + (1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt) +H(τt)τ−σt ]
= στσ−1[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)]
= σ[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)]/τ−σ




σ[(1−H(τt))E(τ−σ | τ ≥ τt)]
τ−σ
≥ 0

























(1− β + βγ∆)
(







The term in brackets, represented by φ(τt), is less than or equal to one. There-
fore, in absolute values | εU(τt) |<| εD(τt) |. 
PROPOSITION 2 [Delay] Higher bindings or higher arrival rates of policy shocks
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(1− β(1− γ)) ((1− β (1− γ∆))
]































ln(1− β (1− γ∆))− d
dγ



















((1− β (1− γ∆))
)
< 0
which is negative since ∆− 1 < 0 whenever τt < τmax.
(b) I use the binding censored version of the profit loss term ∆(τt, B) from equation
101

























The term is brackets is positive and the cutoff is decreasing in the binding. 
A.7 Real Option vs. NPV Cutoffs
In section 3.2 of the text we note that
(i) the cutoff under the option approach is always lower than under the NPV ap-
proach
To see this note that in the absence of the option to wait the last term in (??)
drops out and we obtain the standard NPV cutoff, denoted cMt . Since the last term
in (??) is non-positive the option cutoff is lower, i.e. cUt ≤ cMt , which implies less
entry than under the standard NPV case.
(ii) the cutoff under the NPV approach can be higher or lower than the deterministic
and thus reductions in uncertainty can lead to less incentive for entry under the
NPV approach.
If the deterministic tariff were such that τ−σt = E(τ−σ) then these two cutoffs





= cDt ). But if instead we hold the current tariff at its long-run mean,
i.e. τt = E(τ ′), then the convexity of profits in tariffs implies that the Marshallian
cutoff is higher than the deterministic cutoff. To see this note that if τt = E (τ ′)
then (τt)
−σ = (E (τ ′))−σ ≤ E(τ−σ) (Jensen’s inequality for σ > 1) so cDt ≤ cMt at the
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long run mean of the tariff distribution. This implies that if we actually eliminate
uncertainty while holding the current tariffs equal at the mean in the deterministic
case then there would be less incentive for entry, which is the opposite effect of
uncertainty from what we find using the real option approach.
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Appendix B
Data and Estimation Appendix
B.1 Estimation details
B.1.1 Empirical Implementation in Discrete Case
To construct the empirical measure of ∆ (τt) we consider a discrete probability
distribution for tariffs. We then ask, given that a policy shock above the current trig-
ger τt arrives, what is expected value of the proportional loss in profits? This quantity
is summarized neatly by the term ∆(τt)−1. In the tables below, we compute ∆(τt)−1
for a two- and three-state tariff process relevant to our empirical implementation.
Two State Tariff Distribution: High, Low
Initial State (τT = τs) Probability (ps) ∆(τT = τs)− 1
τh ph 0







In the two state case, any firm with an entry trigger τt ≥ τhwould enter when the
tariff is in the high state. The likelihood of a shock to trade policy leading to a worse
outcome is zero. As was the case with a general continuous distribution, the cutoffs
in the deterministic and uncertain model will coincide. In the low state, ∆(τt) −
1 is nonzero and less than unity. In the estimations, we construct the observable
counterpart to the ∆(τt)−1 from tariff data and assumptions on σ. We then use this
measure to estimate the unobservable parameters γ and ph via regressions.
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Three State Tariff Distribution: High, Medium and Low


















l − τ−σs )]/τ
−σ
l
The three state distribution is slightly more involved, but makes it clear how to
generalize to many discrete states. We argue in the empirical section that Portugal
had “medium” preferential tariffs with respect to Spain by 1983 of a tenuous and
indefinite nature due to the EFTA-Spain agreement. If pm −→ 0, then we see that
the measures in the second and third row coincide with our empirical implementation
for the EC and Spain.
B.1.2 Legacy firms
The true fraction of firms in a market at time t is
n∗tiV
n∗tV






tiV ) if c
U
tiV ≥ max cUt−niV all n
≥ G(cUtiV ) if cUtiV < max cUt−niV
so if cUtiV < max c
U













and (1− δt−n) is the survival proba-
bility until time t of firms that were present at the maximum cutoff period, say it is
t− n . Using the distribution we then get




1 + (1− δt−n)
((
cUt−niV




So if we consider changes in the demand or cost conditions: foreign income, domes-
tic wages, other time variation not product specific, then the policy variables and



















The observed fraction is equal to
n∗tiV
n∗tV
etiv where etiv is some random disturbance




= lnG(cUtiV ) +
≡utiV
(lnλti + ln etiv)
We can then interpret the error term in the text as utiV = ln etiv if c
U
tiV ≥ max cUt−niV
or lnλti + ln etiv otherwise. Since we control for country-time effects this potential
source of legacy does not bias our estimates.
B.1.3 Structural interpretation of parameters












lnKiV (1− β)− k ln cV
)
+ lnntV
+ (uti + rti + uiV + riV + utV + rtV )
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where the last term in brackets simply accounts for the fact that some of the variation
in the utiV + riV t term can be broken down into an importer*year, importer*industry
and industry*time effect (one of the ways to address the legacy firms issues, as de-
scribed above)
ũtiV ≡ utiV + riV t − (uti + rti + uiV + riV + utV + rtV )
B.2 Chapter 2 Data
B.2.1 Data Sources and Descriptions
I use trade flow and product data for all imported exporter-product pairs from
2004 and 2006. These data are at 10-digit level of disaggregation known as the
Harmonized Tariff Items Statistical Codes (HTISC) by Australian Customs. The
data were obtained on an annual basis from Trade Data International, an authorized
re-seller of trade data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1 In 2004 and 2006,
there are over 8,300 products that could be exported from any single country to
Australia.2 I account for the 153 code changes during the period from 2002 to 2006
to avoid spurious entry and exit of products.
Tariff data were extracted from the WTO’s Tariff Analysis On-line system, a
comprehensive database tariff concessions. The Integrated Database includes details
at the 8-digit tariff line level for Australia’s applied MFN tariffs; Generalized System
of Preferences; and other unilateral preference programs. The Consolidated Tariff
Schedules contain a record of Australia’s certified binding concessions at the HS6
level (the level at which bindings are negotiated).
1The HTISC is equivalent to the Harmonized System in the first 6 digits, known as HS6 level.
Following the HS6, the next 2 digits capture “tariff items” and are assigned for further disaggregation
of tariff duties. The final 2 digits are “statistical codes” assigned to provide additional disaggregation
for statistical purposes.
2This degree of product diversity is comparable to that found in the 10-digit U.S. import data
or Combined Nomenclature of the European Union. For comparison, the level of detail in the HS6
data from the UN COMTRADE database tracks just over 5,000 products due to aggregation.
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B.2.2 Product Entry Sample
The sample for entry regressions is a sub-sample of the combined 2004 and 2006
cross-sections. I restrict the sample to products that are non-traded in 2004. New
Zealand does not appear in the entry sample because there is no time variation in
PTA implementation dates or tariffs between 2004 and 2006. As above, because many
countries have no entry or possibly 100% switching to entry within an HS2 defined
industry they are perfectly predicted by fixed effects and dropped from the regression
sample. These criteria leave 420,604 exporter-product observations that were non-
traded in 2004 and could potentially switch to traded status in 2006. Summary
statistics appear in Table ??.
B.3 Chapter 3 Data
B.3.1 Policy Data
B.3.1.1 Pre-accession policy data
The earliest trade data for Portugal is from 1981 and the closest full EC trade
policy schedule before then is for 1980 (OJ L 342, 31.12.1979, p. 1–382 ). This,
and the fact that EC applied tariffs to Portugal in industrial goods were the ones
set in the 1977 agreement, and thus remained in place until 1985, lead us to initially
digitize and use the 1980 schedule.3 The 1980 schedule already reflects some of the
EC multilateral tariff bindings negotiated in the Tokyo Round. However, some of
these bindings, which we use to construct our uncertainty measure, continued to be
reduced over a period of time.4 Therefore, if the worst case scenario for Portuguese
exporters between 1981-1985 was the EC binding then it may have entailed a lower
3While ultimately our baseline results only use data for 1985 and 1987 in order to isolate the
effect of the agreement in 1986 we also planned and ran robustness tests that include earlier years.
4”Implementation of MTN concessions: Note by the secretariat, revision” TAR/W/8/Rev.3,
October 15, 1981
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tariff than that implied by the 1980 binding. Even for those goods where the binding
was falling the 1980 binding may still be the appropriate one to capture the exporter
expectations we model if for example the exporters did not immediately update their
beliefs about the tariff distribution.
We obtained the 1984 trade policy schedule for Spain. This schedule was pub-
lished by the International Customs Tariff Bureau in a set of volumes known as the
International Customs Journal. We believe this was the only full schedule published
in the 1980s for Spain.5 This schedule contains Spain’s preferences relative to Portugal
and the EEC as well as its policy relative to the rest of the world. The documentation
we found implies that Spain’s preferential tariffs for Portugal remained unchanged be-
tween 1984 and 1985 because the EFTA-Spain agreement that regulated these had
reached a phase requiring additional negotiations of indeterminate length.
B.3.1.2 Post-accession policy data
To construct the tariff profile faced by Portugal immediately after the agreement
we applied the concessions schedule in the Articles of Accession, Protocol 3 for Spain
(Official Journal L 302 , 15/11/1985 P. 0410) and Article 243 for the EC (Official
Journal L 302 , 15/11/1985 P. 0094). These imply staged reductions of 12.5% per
year for Spain and 14.2% for EC-10 with some variation across goods.
B.3.1.3 Applied Protection and Uncertainty Measures
The schedules for the EC and Spain were manually keyed into digital format
at the tariff line level by a firm specialized in data entry. We performed a number of
checks to ensure that the quality of the entry and kept track of the few tariff lines with
5These volumes are now published electronically. In the interest of the research community as
a whole, we note that the World Bank-IMF Joint Library in Washington, DC is the only location
that appears to have a reasonably complete set of International Customs Tariff Bureau publications
for the 1960s to 1980s.
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various combinations of minimum and maximum tariffs, specific tariffs and seasonal
tariffs. We then applied preference margins for the EFTA-Spain and EC-Portugal
agreements to compute the applied tariff faced by Portuguese exporters in 1985. We
applied the staged reductions of the Articles of Accession to these schedules for the
EC and Spain to compute the 1987 tariff profile. This yields our tariff line measures
of applied tariffs in 1985 and 1987. The same schedules give us the pre-accession
worst case tariff used to compute the uncertainty measure as described in the main
text. We keep track of the shares of tariff lines with complex and specific tariffs when
aggregating up to the 2-digit Nimexe level and use these as additional controls in the
robustness checks.
B.3.2 Firm and Aggregate Data
Our firm level data is from the Portuguese census (INE). We use the transaction
level trade data available for the period 1981-1992 from customs declaration forms
processed by INE. Since the 1981-1987 trade data had not previously been used we
did several basic exercises to check their accuracy. We found no law establishing
minimum value thresholds for filling out the customs forms in this period. There are
no discontinuities at low values in the shipment value distribution. We confirmed
that the aggregate yearly values of both imports an exports matched those reported
by the official INE printed publication ”Estatisticas do Comercio Externo” for several
years. INE converts data for all years into euros at a rate of 200.482 esc/euro even
before the euro was implemented.
B.3.2.1 Firm identifiers
One statistic (entry and exit rates in 1985 relative to 1984; and 1987 relative
to 1986) and one graph (new vs. continuing exporters in 1987 relative to 1986)
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make use of the shipper’s identifier variable (labelled NPC). INE reports that this
is a unique firm identifier after 1986 and it is in fact used to match trade data to
employment and other firm-level data collected by INE in recent years in other work.
We noticed that in the “new” data we received, the NPC variable prior to 1986
contained different codes and so far neither INE nor Portuguese customs have been
able to provide a correspondence that would allow linking specific firms between 1985
and 1986. However, INE did confirm with Portuguese Customs that the pre-1986
variable provides a unique identifier between 1981-1985. We further investigated
this by calculating statistics by NPC in each year (e.g. industry of modal product
exported, # products, # destinations, total shipment value and weight, etc) and
verifying they were highly correlated in adjacent years, e.g. the elasticity of total
export values by NPC between 1985 and 1984 is one, similarly for other variables.
Moreover, these relationships were identical to those found when comparing adjacent
years in the post-1986 data where the NPC identifier was known to be unique.
B.3.2.2 Destination country
To ensure that country codes are consistent over time we used the official list of
changes in trade partners published yearly in the ”Estatisticas do Comercio Externo”.
When a country splits, the code for the “larger” unit (e.g. Russia) is the same as the
existing (e.g. USSR) and a new code is created for others (e.g. Ukraine). When a
country merges (e.g. Germany) we assign the same code as the largest of the existing
(West Germany) and drop the other (East Germany).
B.3.3 Data sources and definitions
Aggregate Regressions (Table 1 and B1; 1981-1992):
 Exports (ln): ln(nominal value of exports in euro of all goods to country i in
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year t). Source: Author’s calculations based on INE data.
 Number of Firms Exporting (ln): Number of uniquely identified shippers with
positive exports to i in year t. Source: Author’s calculations based on INE data.
 Exports per Firm (ln): ln(Exportsit/Number of firmsit). Source: Author’s cal-
culations based on INE data.
 Real Importer GDP (ln) country i, year t. Source: IMF IFS.
 Importer Price Index (ln): ln nominal GDP-ln real GDP in local currency.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
 Annual exchange Rate (ln): Simple average of ln monthly rate, where latter is
defined as ln((escudo/importer currency)/200.482). The fixed conversion factor
from esc to euro is 200.482 and plays no role in the regressions. Source: Authors
calculations from IMF IFS (monthly).
 Exchange Rate Volatility (ln): standard deviation of log monthly changes in
the year. Source: Authors calculations.
 “Advanced” country dummy: equal 1 if country is US, Japan, Canada, Spain,
EC10 or, EFTA members in 1986 and 0 otherwise.
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B.3.3.1 Firm and policy data in baseline estimates (Tables 3.2-3.6)
 Change in Number of Firms (ln): ln(# firms exporting to i in V , 1987) - ln(#
firms exporting to i in V , 1985) where i is an EC-11 country and V corresponds
to a NIMEXE 2-digit industry. Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Change in Number of Firm-Varieties (ln): ln(# varieties exported to i in V ,
1987) - ln(# varieties exported to i in V , 1985) where “varieties” are defined
as distinct 8-digit NIMEXE products exported by each firm. Source: Authors’
calculations.
 Change in exports (ln): ln(export value to i in V , 1987) - ln(export value to i
in V , 1985). Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Pre Tariff. Source: International Customs Journal: Spain, No. 24, 16th Edition,
1984. EC :Official Journal, L342, 31.12.1979, p. 1-382.
 Post Tariff. Source: Articles of Accession, Official Journal L 302 , 15/11/1985.
 Uncertainty: Proportional reduction in per period profits if the tariff faced
by an exporter reverts from the preferential tariff received prior to accession
(Pre Tariff above) to the tariff received by all non-preferential partners (i.e.
the conventional GATT member tariff). Source: Authors’ calculations using
equation (3.19) with σ = 3 in the baseline regressions.
 NTM Share Change: Difference in share of lines in 2-digit industry with min,
max or other tariff measures between post and pre-agreement period. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
 Specific Tariff Share Change: Difference in the share of lines in 2-digit industry
with specific tariffs between post and pre-agreement period. Source: Authors’
calculations.
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 Price Index Proxy Change (ln): Difference in Spain’s external tariff between
post and pre-agreement period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
B.3.3.2 Other data (Figures and text)
 Import & Export to GDP ratios (Text). Source: Pinheiro et al (1997).
 Trade Shares (Figs. 1 and 2): Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
 Export Firm Entry Growth (Fig. 3) ln(# firms exporting to country i at t)-ln(#
firms exporting to i in 1985). Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Real Export Growth Margins (Figs. 4-6): ln(total nominal export value year
t/total nominal value in 1985)-ln(export price index). Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations.
 Export price index (ln): 1985 base chain price index for exports. Source: Au-
thors’ calculations from yearly price deflators of export goods to all destinations
in Pinheiro et al (1997).
 Employment: Source: Authors calculations using trade data matched to firm
employment data (Quadros Pessoal) by INE.
 Firm identifier (NPC ): unique code that can be used to match firms between
1981-1985. Portuguese customs changed this code in 1986 and it is consistent
for 1986 onwards but not between 1985 and 1986.
 New exporter in year t: Firm exporting somewhere at t but nowhere in t-1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Gross Entry rate in year t: (Total # new exporters in t)/(# exporters t-1).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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 Gross Exit rate in year t: (# exporters with positive exports in t-1 and none
in t)/(# exporters with positive exports in t). Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table B1: Summary Statistics for Gravity Regressions
Variable Mean SD Obs
Exports (ln) 13.84 3.09 1590
Number of Firms Exporting (ln) 3.49 2.01 1590
Exports per Firm (ln) 10.35 1.47 1590
Real Importer GDP (ln) 5.181 3.356 1590
Importer Price Index (ln) -1.283 1.770 1590
Exchange Rate (ln) -2.191 3.166 1590
Exchange Rate Volatility (ln) -3.799 0.869 1583
“Advanced” country dummy 0.136 0.340 1590
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